Lateral Entry of Competent Bulls

Professor David Betz recently posted a blog challenging the “lateral entry” accession barriers related to the U.S. Army officer shortage and talent management. The lateral entry option is, indeed, a complex management issue with real and perceived challenges, but one worthy of additional exploration.  As for the Young Bull versus the Old Bull UK humor David mentions (I shouldn’t go there), age is not important; what really matters in the end is if the bull can perform.

For the sake of argument, perhaps we could examine the lateral entry idea in the context of recruiting an esteemed COIN expert professor to join our ranks. Please allow me to use Professor Betz as an example (with all due respect, of course) and explore the challenge of bringing someone as talented as he is into the U.S. Army via lateral entry. If he has an unknown hidden M.D., law, Chaplaincy, or other professional degree (though not a Ph.D. in war studies or public policy, I’m afraid), it is already a done deal. The Army does have a direct officer commission for these unique professional fields; via this route, he could be directly commissioned in the rank of major or lieutenant colonel. Without those degrees and associated slotting in the medical, judge advocate general, or chaplain corps, let’s suppose he really wants to be an infantry battalion commander, a position commensurate with his age, maturity, and worldly knowledge. Would it be an easy transition for him to suddenly be responsible for the lives and welfare of 700 soldiers in harms way, and to put his own life on the line for his country? Can the bull perform?

Sure, David is a brave man. Yes, he could probably recite FM 3-24 in his sleep. He certainly knows COIN inside and out. I know he appreciates the importance of – and probably enjoys – drinking “three cups of tea.” Maybe he even speaks Arabic, Pashtu, or Urdu. But, does he know the nuances of the systems approach to warfare, peacekeeping, and nation building? Does he know how to manage a joint, combined, multi-national task force? Could we quickly train him to be a lethal shooter/killer as well as a frontline diplomat? Does he know how to use the Army systems such as FBCB2, Blue Force TRACKER, or Command Post of the Future? Does he even “speak Army” or know what the basic terms OER, AR-15, FBCB2, GPS, ILE, CAC, or BOLIC stand for? Does he embody the Army’s ethics and morality training? Is he ready to train his troops on the rules of engagement and schooling them on what they should do if a pregnant Iraqi woman voluntarily places herself as a human shield in front of a room of known insurgents? Can he ace the Army Physical Fitness Test by running two miles in 13 minutes and 36 seconds, do 73 pushups and 76 situps in two minutes? Is he psychologically equipped to handle a dying trooper in his arms? How would he manage the delivery of the tragic news to that soldier’s family back home? How would LTC Betz prevent a soldier from committing suicide when the soldier receives a “Dear John, I’m pregnant with someone else’s child” letter from back home, or if the soldier is suffering from MTBI or PTSD and just can’t take the stress from the threat of the VIEDs that killed his bunkmate? Will LTC Betz stay in the military and deploy for four or five years in a row, setting aside his wife and children and the lucrative salary of a KCL professor?

I am certainly not trying to patronize Professor Betz, but I will take a stand that there are a lot of complex issues for which it takes nuanced education, training, and – especially – developmentally appropriate experience to prepare to meet. As Captain Hyphen clarified, lateral entry *should* be an option, but it is not that easy and the system has spent little time examining mechanisms that may not necessarily be cost effective but which could still help to fill the void (quanitity) and improve our talent management (quality).

The above example infers, perhaps, that we could train David Betz quickly to fill that billet. But I think leadership development goes beyond simple education and training. For the masses (and we cannot count on outliers like Paddy Mayne, Vo Nguyen Giap, or TE Lawrence, although it might be great if all our soldiers had such tenacity), it takes gritty experience at the bottom to gain the be-know-do concepts and maturity to assume such a command position, in my opinion. As most of our deployed leaders have learned, most of that experience and maturity cannot be gained by studying the books. Sure, some of the tasks are mundane and could be performed by a simpleton; but other tasks, especially those carrying international repercussions require a higher-level skill set. I don’t think it takes a lifetime to prepare for this type of field grade command, but it certainly won’t happen in a year or two either.

Further, as David concedes, military culture is a critical component of a soldier’s social fabric. I think understanding the nuances of military culture is important for sanity and job satisfaction.  You have to know what you’re getting into and like it.  As the Army Command and General Staff College states, culture includes the customs, heritage and achievements of a particular segment of society. It is based on the total range of activities and ideas, shared by a group of people with common requirements, customs, laws and traditions. These are transmitted within the group by the thoughts and feelings of the people concerned and are reinforced by actions of individuals and sub-groups to present a whole picture of a common and shared perception of a uniform blend of ideals working and striving towards the achievement of a common goal. This group ultimately working in accordance with and in response to a single ‘will’, political and military attains the objectives laid down for it in peace, and particularly during operations in war. It is essential for the solidarity and cohesion of the force and its professional competence.

Civil servants or private sector individuals from different organizations naturally embody their own organizational cultures, and rightly so. But as one spectator mentions on David’s blog, there is a divide between civilian and military cultures. While it sometimes appears that the gap is closing because of our increasing civ-mil task force engagements and joint assignments, the gap is still very real. Truthfully, many times it is a two-way misunderstanding: the military doesn’t always understand the out of the box thinkers  or even OGA, NGO, or IGO personnel; and conversely, individuals on those teams sometimes do not fully understand the military culture or embrace the warrior ethos and informal and formal “codes.” Even if we improve the mechanisms for lateral entry from the civilian sector to fill the military billets, not every American wants to learn to kill nor are all American s willing to give up their life for our country. Further, we are having a hard enough time as it is recruiting (from the bottom up or from prior service) qualified individuals who are, as the Soldier’s Creed/Warrior Ethos above states, “disciplined, physically and mentally tough, trained and proficient in my warrior tasks and drills.”  Have you seen the new report about the status of potential American recruits?

In a study called “Ready, Willing, and Unable to Serve,” the authors state that about 75 percent of young Americans are unfit to join the military because they are overweight, didn’t finish high school or had scrapes with the law. Further, the report says that 26 million people between the ages of 17 and 24 cannot sign up for the military for these reasons. Specifically: 26 percent of students didn’t graduate on time from high schools in 2009; 32 percent of 10- to 17-year-olds were overweight or obese in 2007; One in every 31 adults were in prison or on probation or parole in 2007.

Sad.

Further, if it were so easy to find individuals qualified for work in the COIN environment, then how should one interpret the status of a U.S. interagency Civilian Response Corps? The idea is a fabulous one, but shows how difficult it is to “recruit laterally” for the contemporary operating environment. Senior defense officials, including the Pentagon’s #3, Michele Flournoy, and the former head of TRADOC’s Combined Arms College at Ft. Leavenworth, LTG Caldwell (now headed to A’stan to lead the ISAF training mission there), have been proponents for bringing the qualified civilians into the arena. In support of such an idea, LTG Caldwell said, “It is imperative that Washington strengthen the ability of nonmilitary agencies to do a host of economic, developmental, diplomatic and political tasks. If you ask commanders on the ground [in Iraq and Afghanistan] what they’re doing, they will tell you 70 percent to 80 percent of what they do every day are things we wouldn’t typically think of as what a military should be doing.”

But, the military is doing it. And, the military is going to keep doing it. Unfortunately, the called-for surge of civilian “bulls” in Afghanistan has not surfaced; neither have various departments been able to fill all the permanent billets for the proposed 250-person civilian team do carry out the “three Ds” of diplomacy, developmental and defense in places where U.S. assistance is needed. If we can’t find a mere 250 civilians to fill these positions, do we think that civilians will be stampeding to wear the uniform instead?

Probably not, but that does not excuse the military from examining this option more closely, especially with prior-service personnel who already know the culture and can perform. Talent management demands as much.

Looking the wrong way?

I’m sure this is not a unique thought, but I thought I’d ‘get it out there’…. inspired by the horror-story of a friend of mine at Bristol Uni who had this critique made of his work, I’ve thought about it a little bit, and then on hearing Lord Ashdown et al this morning talking about Bosnia I’d share it.

The problems western powers have faced since the early 1990s have not been about the reconstruction of states, but have been more acutely focussed on how to destroy states in a way that facilitates their reconstruction.

Put more simply, where is the doctrine and thinking about state destruction?

We know how to remove the levers of coercive power from those occupying it (Iraq is a good example) but we didn’t know how to do this in a way that paved the way towards reconstruction. The oft-cited example of how the western powers handled the Iraqi armed forces is a good one in this light, as is the handling of myriad civil servants and border control guards. Put simply, if you remove all the levers of coercive power, what you are left with is an unwieldy bugger’s muddle.

If you do a cursory, or even indepth, lit search you’ll discover that there was a veritable full scale nationalised industry in writing about ‘post-conflict reconstruction’ in the 90s and noughties, and this spread out into conflict, security and development. All very worthy, all very interesting… and all very liberal, in the pejorative sense of the word.

It is all very well ‘wanting to help people’, who doesn’t? But reconstruction is premised on the need to reconstruct something, and that something must have been destroyed.. and whilst we are all lovely people who read The Times, wear sensible jumpers and eat cheese, we are variously involved in or living within authorities who did the destroying bit… And it would be jolly nice, and a lot more sensible to focus our attentions on  - as the late McNamara once said in paraphrase – killing people in a smarter way. Because only in thinking about how we tear down a state, remove its leaders, and the levers of coercive power, will we be able to achieve the sorts of reconstruction activity that liberal academics, liberal NGOs and liberal politicians so crave.

So, I’d issue a challenge to the funding councils, and to any government who fancies taking it on.. why not fund some serious research into the art and science of state destruction? And for the record: no, I don’t want to do it. There are far better qualified people than me.

It’s just a jump to the left, and then a step to the right

Recently on KOW Paula in ‘The US Army Officer Shortage and Talent Management‘ and Captain Hyphen in ‘Stars Upon Thars‘ make a very similar claim. Says Paula:

“Unlike the corporate sector, which can expand or contract quickly in response to market needs, pulling talent from various sources such as the military or various industries,” there is no lateral entry in the Army because our developmental structure and “industry-specific” training limit the ability of even a successful corporate leader to assimilate quickly into the culture.

And says Captain Hyphen:

How a bureaucracy without lateral entry promotes and selects its leaders is a vital issue with implications measured in decades, dollars, and lives.

I just want to ask why? More precisely, why no lateral transfer? I get what Paula says about ‘industry-specific’ training and the problems of assimilating into the culture rapidly. But aren’t these two separate issues–training and acculturation? Moreover, what is the evidence that military ‘industry-specific’ training is, in fact, such a barrier to lateral entry? Not a rhetorical question: I’d really like to know; all information welcome. I grant that it might; but what’s the evidence that it really does? Moreover, how does this apply across the spectrum of ranks? Maybe it requires a whole lifetime to learn how to command and to lead a whole army but what about the 99.9 per cent who don’t make it to the highest ranks of generalship? I’m not sure why the argument against lateral transfer from civilian myriad civilian professions to the military profession is regarded as so so cast in iron. It seems to me at odds with a number of observations.

First, it happens all the time in other industries. It’s not at all unusual for people now to change from one field to a completely different one sometimes more than once in a lifetime. Man or woman climbs to the top of one profession or business, makes a mint, crushes all their competitors (or whatever) and, having reached the pinnacle of one mountain, asks him or herself ‘what next?’ A different mountain! It happens so often now in the teaching profession it’s a bit of a cliche: I have two friends, both PhDs–one in science, the other in finance–both in late 30s-early 40s, who’ve decided they want to be teachers (for a lot less money) because they crave something different, something they consider more meaningful. Irony of the story: the retraining programme in this country is so oversubscribed that both have been turned away. The Army has long said it is a force for good in the world; perhaps some of these highly qualified do-gooders might be convinced that they could self-actualize in khaki.

Second, I wonder if the the physical barrier is overstated–or at any rate more complex than is generally put forward. A cursory examination of the websites of the UK triathlon association (have a look at the ages of people on the roll of honour) and the US triathlon association (have a look at their FAQ on the fastest growing demographic) shows pretty plainly that there are quite a lot of highly active 35+ year olds who I assume would meet or exceed the physical requirements of most of the combat arms. It is true of course that there is a large difference between running a triathlon in your Nikes and a t-shirt and humping half or more of your body weight in armour, ammo, water, weapon, IED-countermeasure brick and other seemingly mission critical impedimenta over hill and dale in all weather that is the lot of your average infantryman who needs to be physically and mentally tough, which is not exactly the same as healthy. Speaking personally, the difference between my 20 year old self and my 40 year old self is less what I can do physically on any given day and more how much it hurts the day after. I would suggest two things: kit needs to be made lighter (but this is the case even with today’s young privates); and DARPA or DSTL should institute a crash program for better drugs for oldsters.

Three, the other skills factor in today’s wars amongst the people is pretty extreme–as Paula acknowledges. It would seem that we actually need in our uniformed services rather a broad range of skills that are not all that easy to build-up inside the organization. If it turns out that your army spends a lot of time doing municipal governance, power station maintenance, community nursing, or any of the hundreds of other occupations soldiers have been forced by default of being the one on the ground into performing, then maybe it makes sense to recruit from some of the places where these skills exist. Moreover, while young men (in particular) bring some very important things to the show–underdeveloped mortal fear, desire to prove themselves, and eagerness to bond with a group–older folk bring a few things too which perhaps are especially handy in a war amongst the people. You know the joke of the Old Bull and the Young Bull? Which of the two do you think has a better intuitive grasp of the Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency?

Fourth, history is full of examples of absolutely superb soldiers who came from civilian backgrounds. Paddy Mayne, rugby player, founds the SAS. Vo Nguyen Giap, school teacher, hounds the French and Americans from Vietnam. TE Lawrence, student/eccentric, helps to lead the Arab Revolt against the Ottomans. This is off the top of my head and so quite likely I am simply cherry-picking from history; nonetheless it seems to me that there is some connection between revolutionary times, irregular adaptation, and the need to think ‘out of the box which makes lateral transfer not merely possible but maybe desirable.  I’m not against tradition, conservatism, hierarchy per se–these are good things for an army, by and large, particularly in peacetime. But not losing is also a good thing. So good in fact that if ‘talent management’ is our main concern then why are we restricting the talent pool? If these are revolutionary times then maybe we should be shaking up the hierarchy a bit?

Fathers, Grandfathers, and Godfathers of the Surge

There are many proclaimed fathers, grandfathers, and godfathers behind the ”surge” of American and allied troops in the Iraq War.  Who designed the approach that turned the tide of the war?  How did the new approach gain traction inside the DC Beltway?  What are the lessons learned for aspring military leaders?

The Surge: the Untold Story provides a historical account of U.S. military operations in Iraq during the Surge of forces during 2007 and 2008. This documentary offers audiences a unique look into the real story of the Surge in Iraq, as told by U.S. military commanders and diplomats as well as Iraqis.

For those interested in the history of the “surge,” you can now view a well developed online documentary produced by the Institute for the Study of War.

For COIN, Iraq War, and military history researchers, there is an excellent timeline and detailed biographies of the key players available as well.

What makes this different from other stories I have heard about the Surge?
Audiences will watch never-before-seen interviews from high profile figures like General David Petraeus, General Raymond Odierno, and Ambassador Ryan Crocker. This documentary reveals the personalities of this generation of U.S. military leaders and explains how they successfully implemented a counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq that brought the country back from the brink of civil war and catastrophe.

2009 Afghan Mood Survey

In case you have not seen it…

Afghanistan in 2009: A Survey of the Afghan People

 

On October 27, 2009, The Asia Foundation released findings from its fifth public opinion poll in Afghanistan, Afghanistan in 2009: A Survey of the Afghan People, which covers all 34 provinces in the country. The Asia Foundation has conducted five surveys, dating back to 2004, which collectively establish an accurate, long-term barometer of public opinion across the country to help assess the direction in which Afghanistan is moving in the post-Taliban era. The 2009 survey captures the Afghan public’s perceptions of reconstruction, security, governance, and attitudes towards government and informal institutions, as well as the 2009 national elections, the status of women, the role of Islam, and the impact of media. The fieldwork for the survey was conducted prior to the August 20 elections, from June 17 – July 6, 2009, when 648 Afghan men and women conducted in-person interviews with a multi-stage random sample of 6,406 Afghan citizens 18 years of age and older from different social, economic, and ethnic communities in rural and urban across all provinces in Afghanistan.

Read the press release about the survey or download the full report, Afghanistan in 2009: A Survey of the Afghan People. Key findings, FAQ, and Dari and Pashto translations of the key findings and press release are also available.

2004-2008 national mood:

Thoughts?

Doodlings on Intel

I would like to say this post is about Afghanistan, but it isn’t… apologies.

I have been thinking about the machinery of British intelligence and I wonder whether the following makes better sense:

Unifying the counterterrorism efforts of MI5 and SIS into a super-JTAC (to be a similar size as one of the agencies), with people trafficking and serious organised crime also within this organisation (given the overlap between all of these areas) so, the CT of MI5/SIS + SOCA. This is an acceptance of the reality (as JTAC was) that the distinction between domestic and international is now defunct. It also overcomes any remaining institutional barriers. They can fight over the building they want.

All intelligence on domestic subversives to be done by the various policing agencies (Special Branch and Netcu – which I may post on at a future point).

Long-range intelligence analysis to be done by outsourced means – so a cadre of academics, private intelligence analysts, research specialists. This would affect DIS-types, Assessments Staff etc. Short term analysis would be done by the Analysis Pool as present, but it would be a unified staff with a single CV.

Counterintelligence would need a home, but seeing as this appears to be an area in tension at the moment, this might not be a bad call. Economic and industrial espionage (which became a large area in the 1990s would also get a discreet institutional home). GCHQ would stay exactly as it is.

As I say, just random doodlings, inspired by too much afternoon cake. But all thoughts are welcome, as always.

New blog for the rolls: al Sahawa (‘the awakening’)

Across the pond some of my current and former colleagues have started up what is quickly becoming a must-read, al Sahwa. There are few public forums in which current and former junior  officers share their analysis on events concerning intel and irregular warfare, and those taking part are some of the smartest I know in the field. For the genesis of the blog, see Pat Ryan’s original post.

On Leadership: A Question of Command

In an earlier blog regarding the U.S. Army Officer Shortage, I highlighted a few problems with officer talent management that link to leadership development. In the interest of improving leadership development for our officer corps, I have been reading an great book by Dr. Mark Moyar of the U.S. Marine Corps University, A Question of Command:  Counterinsurgency from the Civil War to Iraq from Yale University Press, New Haven, CT, 2009.

A Question of Command

As evidenced by the over-registered Marine Corps University’s conference on “COIN Leadership in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Beyond,” where GEN Petraeus gave the keynote address to the “COIN Nation,” there is a thirst for understanding the role of individual leadership in the COIN arena.

Readers from all ranks will be interested in Moyar’s succint identification of what it takes to succeed in the contemporary operating environment. Anyone who understands that effective leadership in a counterinsurgency setting — or the conventional battlefield — often does come down to the behavior of one individual will find that this book resonates with important themes.

Some background on why the book is a “must read:”

Moyar’s book has valuable lessons for the Army as well as other organizations and industries that operate in extremis. Operating effectively in extreme environments requires more than a “competent” leader. It requires a talented leader. Anything less than the right talent could make the difference between life and death. Lending viability to Moyar’s claims, a newly released Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) paper discusses the related implications of talent management, highlighting key definitions:  the “definition of talent is a special natural ability or capacity for achievement. Competent, on the other hand, is defined as merely proficient or having requisite or adequate ability.” Unfortunately, the U.S. Army doesn’t always acknowledge the varied distribution of skills that our officer corps brings to the table; and therefore, we don’t always do a great job placing them where their talents are effectively used, nor where the military needs them most. Moyar’s insights, based on qualitative and quantitative analyses, offer explicit criteria for the variables that we should screen for in our officer recruitment efforts and better develop in our leadership training efforts to ensure we identify an employ the right talent for the right position.

With that caveat emptor in mind, I present below a brief overview of the book, insights from field leaders who have reviewed the book, and a tacit response to a Small Wars Journal review of the book by Matthew Caris.

Eloquence and Detail in NATO’s Strategic Concept

This is a guest post by Phil Ehr, a PhD student in the department biding his time reading blogs while waiting for his viva.

Seminars are underway to develop NATO’s new strategic concept.  The primary expectation for this project is to make a clear and convincing public case for NATO’s future viability.  Madeline Albright and the Group of Experts leading this project appropriately envision a succinct document written in elegant prose to address and perhaps resolve some of the headline issues.  Speaking at the First Seminar on NATO’s Strategic Concept, she reiterated her aim to avoid a “polite but false consensus” and to provide “practical answers to some inescapable questions”:

 For example, does [the strategic concept] take into account the full spectrum of dangers alliance members will face?

Does it provide the basis for timely and unified action in response to the highest priority threats?

Does it establish a workable balance between traditional and nontraditional missions?

Does it clarify the scope and meaning of collective self-defence?

Does it instil confidence that every ally will be heard and that each will pull its full weight?

And does it ensure that NATO’s resources are sufficient to meet NATO’s responsibilities?

  Satisfactory answers to these and similar questions may be elusive but are crucial.  Later in her remarks, Albright posed her fundamental strategic and geopolitical question:

 …if NATO isn’t prepared to respond to 21^st century dangers, who will be?

Regardless of where Alliance members emerge on issues raised in these and other fundamental questions, they should seize the occasion of the strategic concept document to provide implementation guidance to NATO’s multifaceted structure to improve internal effectiveness.  Such guidance, written in precise detail and published as the strategic concept’s ‘fine print’ is needed to update critical processes.  Counterintuitively, reforming routine practices would make the geopolitical questions easier to answer.  One such reform currently underway illustrates how internal details produce strategic benefits:

Non-NATO countries are now welcomed into NATO standardisation committees and field experiments where unclassified standards are developed.  Promoting interoperability among armies, navies and air forces is arguably NATO’s most operationally relevant function.  If procedures and expectations to expand interoperability beyond Alliance membership are ingrained into NATO’s institutional practice, political options will expand and military effectiveness will improve in a wide variety of future operations.

Extending access of non-NATO countries into NATO’s standardisation process strengthens the Alliance to a strategically significant degree, yet the drafters of a succinct and eloquent strategic concept may struggle with the detail NATO institutions require to change in other significant ways.  Two other areas that warrant consideration for the ‘fine print’ are planning at senior levels and decision making at junior levels:

Continue evolution of the defence planning process with a view toward a more prominent role for military influence in the politico-military decisions having more immediate impact on the conduct of operations.  Areas to review include authority to initiate planning for alternative courses of action in campaigns, other ongoing operations and crisis management situations; the development of the combined joint task force concept; planning targets and force goals for the NATO response force.  

Remove all requirements for consensus decisions in NATO committees and working groups unless a flag or general officer (or equally senior civilian) personally attends the meeting and objects to a majority position.  The longstanding principle of common consent and support is appropriate in the North Atlantic Council and the more senior NATO bodies.  Too many cases of indecision in the array of NATO committees and working groups, however, demonstrate that decisions by consensus are no longer appropriate at all levels.  The shock to NATO culture from this change may be mitigated by allowing the North Atlantic Council or Military Committee to authorise and periodically review specific committees to retain consensus decision making.

Similar issues gleaned from NATO summit communiques and observations from current operations, NATO response force preparation and air defence exercises will struggle to be included in the main body of the strategic concept on the grounds they would appear tedious to the general public.  While the Group of Experts engages the public and national defence officials on the headline issues, the Secretary General should convene another group of experts (small case letters) to draft internal reforms for the North Atlantic Council to consider and adopt with the new strategic concept.  These reforms are required for NATO to more effectively deter and engage in modern warfare.

Some may reply that mixing NATO’s headline issues with efficiency improvements would detract from the strategic concept’s raisons d’être; however, in addition to the self-evident benefits, organisational effectiveness is a factor in the strategic attribute of Alliance cohesion.  The result of including institutional reforms within the scope of this project would result in a greater contribution to NATO’s future viability.

Those interested in participating in NATO’s discussion forum on the strategic concept may do so at this link.

 

 

Is Afganistan easy?

I was going to kick off by apologising for yet another post on Afghanistan. But then again, this is a major policy issue. It could define what happens in the region, what happens to the serving people of America and her allies, and it could define the Obama Administration, and has a great consequences for the American people. And folk with experience in the country read KOW, so its probably not far from their minds either.

If there’s one thing we can agree on, its that we all disagree about this war. Afghanistan divides strategists and policymakers and pundits and soldiers and regional experts. And that’s because its hard, as a certain recent President used to say. Its complex and the judgment calls are tough and deal with narrow margins. Right?

But as Stephen Walt makes a case against escalation, he thinks not:

Unlike many of the pundits who are now telling Obama what to do, I think it’s actually a rather easy call (assuming, of course, your first priority is the U.S. national interest).

Ultimately I agree with Walt’s verdict that escalation is indeed not worth the cost. And we’ve all been tempted into the habit of thinking that we are ’sane’ and that people who disagree are bad or mad.  But is it that straightforward?

Its like one aspect of debating torture. Opponents of torture enjoy arguing that not only is torture wrong, it doesn’t work. It taints us and delivers misinformation, and even makes us less safe in the long run. But what if Dick Cheney is right, and ‘coercive interrogation’ can deliver vital information that saves lives? Our principles start to feel a lot more uncomfortable.

Principles are much easier to embrace when they are cost-free, so to speak. But most good things in life aren’t free. Certainly in the realm of policy. Trade0ffs and flip-sides are the norm.

And even if making the ‘right’ call about Afghanistan does come without a cost, we can’t know that in advance. Given that experts on the country, on its culture, on small wars, on strategy, can’t agree, its better to proceed on the assumption that there are indeed penalties for whatever decision America makes.

For example, even on the issue of space and security, there are just so many views. How great is America’s interest in denying Afghanistan to the Taliban in order to deny safe havens to AQ? How important is a state sponsor? How easy is it for terrorist networks to migrate? Even if they do return, is it enough to keep them endangered and hiding? Would an AQ haven in Iraq or Somalia be more or less dangerous than in Af/Pak? What are we willing to pay and risk to prevent these scenarios? How far could the US contain or ‘manage’ the Taliban/AQ relationship from afar?

So while Walt is right that the ‘national interest’ is the key question for Americans in the debate, there are very eloquent and competing views on what it is or how to measure it.

The point here is that responsible argument over strategy should always try to define the likely costs of any action.

A strategy of extrication, of some approach that looks to draw down to a ‘light footprint’ presence, is just bound to bring some bad consequences if we are dealing with an impoverished weak state that outsiders have a vested interest in controlling and profiting from. It is likely to be interpreted by jihadists as a humiliating retreat. It will mean that sunk costs and lost lives seem to be wasted. It will create opportunities for a Taliban resurgence. It may well lower actionable intelligence on terror networks that a more intensive military presence would bring. More generally, it may create a vacuum and we don’t know exactly what would fill it. We don’t know how powerful the Taliban or its rival groups would be and who would win out, and we don’t know whether drawing down would lead to state collapse, or to the state reasserting itself as it focuses its mind. What would do more to destabilise Pakistan, withdrawal or ramping up?

The problem is not whether these dangers exist, but how severe are they and whether they outweigh the costs of escalating. Isn’t it?

Hell, we are still unsure of the long-term consequences of the ’surge’ in Iraq. Do we see a constitutional government holding on in a long-term move towards political reconciliation, or the first rounds of new crescendoes of communal bloodletting? Was it a decisive intervention in terms of national politics, or was it an inspired move that still only postponed a set of civil wars by a few years?

The same need to consider the ‘down side’ applies to the other side. Rather than just dismiss anxieties about ‘cost’ or talk as though only doubters have any explaining to do, hawks need to reckon fully with the price-tag escalation could bring. One thing we do know is that divisive wars fought by liberal democracies abroad, from the Boer War to Vietnam and beyond, can consume and dominate domestic politics and make it much harder to get other vital things done. Governments need their energy, political capital and support base, and this can be eroded. In other words, the costs are potentially much more than financial.

Identifying and measuring the unknowns and dangers is a better and more persuasive way of arguing it through than assuming that the right path is clear in advance and that one’s antagonists are either deluded ideologues or mentally defective. Strategy isn’t for those who like their free lunches. (Though free lunches are great – Ed).