Professor David Betz recently posted a blog challenging the “lateral entry” accession barriers related to the U.S. Army officer shortage and talent management. The lateral entry option is, indeed, a complex management issue with real and perceived challenges, but one worthy of additional exploration. As for the Young Bull versus the Old Bull UK humor David mentions (I shouldn’t go there), age is not important; what really matters in the end is if the bull can perform.
For the sake of argument, perhaps we could examine the lateral entry idea in the context of recruiting an esteemed COIN expert professor to join our ranks. Please allow me to use Professor Betz as an example (with all due respect, of course) and explore the challenge of bringing someone as talented as he is into the U.S. Army via lateral entry. If he has an unknown hidden M.D., law, Chaplaincy, or other professional degree (though not a Ph.D. in war studies or public policy, I’m afraid), it is already a done deal. The Army does have a direct officer commission for these unique professional fields; via this route, he could be directly commissioned in the rank of major or lieutenant colonel. Without those degrees and associated slotting in the medical, judge advocate general, or chaplain corps, let’s suppose he really wants to be an infantry battalion commander, a position commensurate with his age, maturity, and worldly knowledge. Would it be an easy transition for him to suddenly be responsible for the lives and welfare of 700 soldiers in harms way, and to put his own life on the line for his country? Can the bull perform?
Sure, David is a brave man. Yes, he could probably recite FM 3-24 in his sleep. He certainly knows COIN inside and out. I know he appreciates the importance of – and probably enjoys – drinking “three cups of tea.” Maybe he even speaks Arabic, Pashtu, or Urdu. But, does he know the nuances of the systems approach to warfare, peacekeeping, and nation building? Does he know how to manage a joint, combined, multi-national task force? Could we quickly train him to be a lethal shooter/killer as well as a frontline diplomat? Does he know how to use the Army systems such as FBCB2, Blue Force TRACKER, or Command Post of the Future? Does he even “speak Army” or know what the basic terms OER, AR-15, FBCB2, GPS, ILE, CAC, or BOLIC stand for? Does he embody the Army’s ethics and morality training? Is he ready to train his troops on the rules of engagement and schooling them on what they should do if a pregnant Iraqi woman voluntarily places herself as a human shield in front of a room of known insurgents? Can he ace the Army Physical Fitness Test by running two miles in 13 minutes and 36 seconds, do 73 pushups and 76 situps in two minutes? Is he psychologically equipped to handle a dying trooper in his arms? How would he manage the delivery of the tragic news to that soldier’s family back home? How would LTC Betz prevent a soldier from committing suicide when the soldier receives a “Dear John, I’m pregnant with someone else’s child” letter from back home, or if the soldier is suffering from MTBI or PTSD and just can’t take the stress from the threat of the VIEDs that killed his bunkmate? Will LTC Betz stay in the military and deploy for four or five years in a row, setting aside his wife and children and the lucrative salary of a KCL professor?
I am certainly not trying to patronize Professor Betz, but I will take a stand that there are a lot of complex issues for which it takes nuanced education, training, and – especially – developmentally appropriate experience to prepare to meet. As Captain Hyphen clarified, lateral entry *should* be an option, but it is not that easy and the system has spent little time examining mechanisms that may not necessarily be cost effective but which could still help to fill the void (quanitity) and improve our talent management (quality).
The above example infers, perhaps, that we could train David Betz quickly to fill that billet. But I think leadership development goes beyond simple education and training. For the masses (and we cannot count on outliers like Paddy Mayne, Vo Nguyen Giap, or TE Lawrence, although it might be great if all our soldiers had such tenacity), it takes gritty experience at the bottom to gain the be-know-do concepts and maturity to assume such a command position, in my opinion. As most of our deployed leaders have learned, most of that experience and maturity cannot be gained by studying the books. Sure, some of the tasks are mundane and could be performed by a simpleton; but other tasks, especially those carrying international repercussions require a higher-level skill set. I don’t think it takes a lifetime to prepare for this type of field grade command, but it certainly won’t happen in a year or two either.
Further, as David concedes, military culture is a critical component of a soldier’s social fabric. I think understanding the nuances of military culture is important for sanity and job satisfaction. You have to know what you’re getting into and like it. As the Army Command and General Staff College states, culture includes the customs, heritage and achievements of a particular segment of society. It is based on the total range of activities and ideas, shared by a group of people with common requirements, customs, laws and traditions. These are transmitted within the group by the thoughts and feelings of the people concerned and are reinforced by actions of individuals and sub-groups to present a whole picture of a common and shared perception of a uniform blend of ideals working and striving towards the achievement of a common goal. This group ultimately working in accordance with and in response to a single ‘will’, political and military attains the objectives laid down for it in peace, and particularly during operations in war. It is essential for the solidarity and cohesion of the force and its professional competence.
Civil servants or private sector individuals from different organizations naturally embody their own organizational cultures, and rightly so. But as one spectator mentions on David’s blog, there is a divide between civilian and military cultures. While it sometimes appears that the gap is closing because of our increasing civ-mil task force engagements and joint assignments, the gap is still very real. Truthfully, many times it is a two-way misunderstanding: the military doesn’t always understand the out of the box thinkers or even OGA, NGO, or IGO personnel; and conversely, individuals on those teams sometimes do not fully understand the military culture or embrace the warrior ethos and informal and formal “codes.” Even if we improve the mechanisms for lateral entry from the civilian sector to fill the military billets, not every American wants to learn to kill nor are all American s willing to give up their life for our country. Further, we are having a hard enough time as it is recruiting (from the bottom up or from prior service) qualified individuals who are, as the Soldier’s Creed/Warrior Ethos above states, “disciplined, physically and mentally tough, trained and proficient in my warrior tasks and drills.” Have you seen the new report about the status of potential American recruits?
In a study called “Ready, Willing, and Unable to Serve,” the authors state that about 75 percent of young Americans are unfit to join the military because they are overweight, didn’t finish high school or had scrapes with the law. Further, the report says that 26 million people between the ages of 17 and 24 cannot sign up for the military for these reasons. Specifically: 26 percent of students didn’t graduate on time from high schools in 2009; 32 percent of 10- to 17-year-olds were overweight or obese in 2007; One in every 31 adults were in prison or on probation or parole in 2007.
Sad.
Further, if it were so easy to find individuals qualified for work in the COIN environment, then how should one interpret the status of a U.S. interagency Civilian Response Corps? The idea is a fabulous one, but shows how difficult it is to “recruit laterally” for the contemporary operating environment. Senior defense officials, including the Pentagon’s #3, Michele Flournoy, and the former head of TRADOC’s Combined Arms College at Ft. Leavenworth, LTG Caldwell (now headed to A’stan to lead the ISAF training mission there), have been proponents for bringing the qualified civilians into the arena. In support of such an idea, LTG Caldwell said, “It is imperative that Washington strengthen the ability of nonmilitary agencies to do a host of economic, developmental, diplomatic and political tasks. If you ask commanders on the ground [in Iraq and Afghanistan] what they’re doing, they will tell you 70 percent to 80 percent of what they do every day are things we wouldn’t typically think of as what a military should be doing.”
But, the military is doing it. And, the military is going to keep doing it. Unfortunately, the called-for surge of civilian “bulls” in Afghanistan has not surfaced; neither have various departments been able to fill all the permanent billets for the proposed 250-person civilian team do carry out the “three Ds” of diplomacy, developmental and defense in places where U.S. assistance is needed. If we can’t find a mere 250 civilians to fill these positions, do we think that civilians will be stampeding to wear the uniform instead?
Probably not, but that does not excuse the military from examining this option more closely, especially with prior-service personnel who already know the culture and can perform. Talent management demands as much.




