Theo Farrell, KoW pioneer, writes in the Guardian on his recent trip to Afghanistan. He’s upbeat:
Notwithstanding the tragic events in Nad-e’Ali, the Afghan security forces are getting better, as is the partnership between Afghans and the International Security Assistance Force. I saw this most visibly in Garmsir, where I spent some time with the US marines. Garmsir district centre has tarmac roads, solar streetlights and a thriving bazaar. US-run Radio Garmsir pumps out popular programming courtsey of its two local DJs; it also receives over 1,000 letters a month from listeners. Most striking of all, the marines trust Afghan police and soldiers to secure the district centre. Garmsir feels very much like a society that is shaking off the shackles of war.
Sounds good. What do you make of it?
Tags: Afghanistan, Counterinsurgency, Theo Farrell
Monday, 9, November, 2009 at 12:03 pm |
Sounds almost verbatim like reports that were coming from South Vietnam in about 1964.
Monday, 9, November, 2009 at 1:50 pm |
I hope this does not take us back to discussing the nuances of analogies, similes and metaphors.
Monday, 9, November, 2009 at 1:55 pm
Because analogies have nuances should we abandon learning from history? The larger point is that every insurgency has periods of progress. Sometimes they are sustainable, at other times they are temporary. It’s nearly impossible to tell which is which on the spot, so best to not read too much into them.
Monday, 9, November, 2009 at 2:38 pm
I was only kidding old son.
Monday, 9, November, 2009 at 1:33 pm |
Well it is certainly a move in the correct direction, when compared to our [the UK’s} paltry efforts in the region of Garmsir. The numbers we sent down their were not significent enough to have any real influence over the town and region and thus we were not credibile in the Afghan’s mind.
This thriving effect is most likely because it was, until the USMC’s involvement, the limit of ISAF influence and presence and thus about as close to a conventional frontline as is possible. Now ISAF has pushed South, the fight has gone and a lull in the battle is now being experienced. I suggest a concerted IED campaign is not too far away. The trick being to harness the effect and the security feeling, resource the undoubted intelligence 1000 letters a month produces and use it to prevent any terrorism.
The powers that be in Sangin could take note.
Monday, 9, November, 2009 at 1:41 pm |
It’s the kind of article that raises as many questions as answers. Is the wheat-for-opium plan heavily subsidised? How sustainable is it? Who are the main players in the local justice system? Without wishing to be cynical, we can make any relatively small part of the country look good by throwing vast amounts of resource at it. I also think the Taliban will be as happy to get electricity for their laptops as the locals, and thriving markets also equal greater indirect taxation. In short-creating an oilspot is not really the hard part- once the initial fighting is done and there are enough troops to hold a perimeter. Spreading and joining them up whilst avoiding re-infiltration is. Otherwise we have a beautiful series of Potemkin villages.
Monday, 9, November, 2009 at 2:58 pm |
Off topic, but wanted to flag it up – one of the best pieces of war reporting I’ve seen in ages appeared in the Sunday Times this weekend: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article6907794.ece
Monday, 9, November, 2009 at 3:38 pm |
There is some interesting and important anecdotal evidence in this article, but crucially it is by and large just that – anecdotal. There is a degree of extrapolation from a small area to the whole country, which is problematic. As Farrell notes, local efforts are essential to improving security. Yet, as the issue of poppy cultivation mentioned here demonstrates, an effective local approach is worthless unless implemented on a national basis, and this requires serious increases in manpower. Otherwise, poppy production simply shifts to another area, as does insurgent activity. There is also a tendency to suppose the physical presence of the Marines and/or ANSF means the Taleban are absent. It is more likely that elements of their organisation will remain in a location even when the fighting forces withdraw, in order to continue gathering intelligence and to influence the population. Farrell should be careful not to mistake military optimism (an institutional norm) with objective improvements in the security situation. The lack of contact with either locals or the Taleban inevitably results in a partial impression. On the other hand, his optimism is a refreshing antidote to the widespread skepticism about Western strategy in the country. What does he know that others have failed to grasp?
Monday, 9, November, 2009 at 4:59 pm |
as someone who remains far away from Afghanistan, its interesting listening to the diametrically opposed views of those who have been there, such as Theo and Rory Stewart. Theo sees progress; Stewart thinks we are driving off a cliff.
‘Green shoots’ of progress after eight years sounds awfully fragile and modest for the billions spent and lives lost so far. We are also seeing some very sturdy plants of trouble, such as the Helmand elections and the problem of creating a viable political alternative in Kabul strong enough that Afghans want to fight for and live under, which seems to be what we are trying to do.
Then there is public opinion back home. Even if our own peoples’ view is wrong, that this is unwinnable and not worth it, this war is still going to be a very hard sell over the next few years. Time and political will is a huge problem. And that itself could be decisive.
Monday, 9, November, 2009 at 5:01 pm |
Although I’ve already been chided for using the Vietnam analogy, the same phenomenon held there. People assigned to the Central Highlands had a very different perception of the progress of the conflict than those in the Delta.
Monday, 9, November, 2009 at 6:50 pm
You make an excellent and often overlooked or at least under-appreciated point. As in most wars, much depends on where one is and what period of time it is. Another example is how different the war was in the far north near the DMZ. Terrain, weather, enemy, indigenous population etc. very different from AOs to the south. Often when discussing details with others who were further south or in my area but there much earlier it is as if we were in 2 totally different wars.
Monday, 9, November, 2009 at 8:02 pm |
This business with the DJs of Radio Garmsir is quite amusing, but I fear there appears some fuzzy math at work here. Please consider the following. According to the DJs themselves located at FOB Delhi, for the month of September 2009 they received 1,000 letters, though they admit they normally receive 50 letters per day, which in the course of a month would add up to 1,500 letters, though admittedly some deduction would need to be made for those days of the week when the mail is not delivered. But let us assume the low number – 1,000 letters of fan mail per month – is accurate. According to the radio station’s own numbers, they are only able to broadcast within a 20 km range within Garmsir District. The population of Garmsir District as a whole is estimated to be around 75,000, though one must assume that not everyone in the district falls within the 20km radius of FOB Delhi. However, as it is impossible to know the exact disposition of the population, let us assume all 75,000 can listen to Radio Garmsir. It should also be noted that the literacy rate for Helmand, according to Peter Bergen, is 8% for men and 1% for women. Again, it is impossible to guess what percentage of the population is male, but taking the national average of 1.05 males/females, it can be assumed that Garmsir district consists of approximately 37,500 males and 37,500 females. Now, assuming that only those Afghans who are literate can write fan mail, and assuming that the letters in question are being written by different fans, as opposed to the same fans over and over again, this works out to 3,000 males and 375 females who are able to write letters. Thus we come to a ratio of one letter writer per 3.375 literate persons or 29.6% of the literate community of Garmsir. These numbers may be somewhat off though as the DJs themselves have noted that they are receiving an increasing number of perfumed letters, which would suggest a significant number of women are writing in. However, as the fan mail seems to have been arriving at roughly the same rate for several months now, perhaps it could be inferred that every single literate person in Garmsir has been tuning into the station and has been writing letters. I’d say that is pretty good going, and to the best of my recollection is the most successful example of strategic communications I’ve yet come across. However, this also has a negative side as well. At 1,000 letters per month which are posted locally, presumably the post office at FOB Delhi is being overwhelmed with the amount of mail they have to scan for letter bombs, thus requiring a good number of man hours to deal with screening fan mail. My heart goes out to the mail clerks at FOB Delhi. With luck they will not go on strike!!!
Monday, 9, November, 2009 at 9:32 pm |
You ARE joking, right?
…let us assume all 75,000 can listen to Radio Garmsir.
….assuming that only those Afghans who are literate can write fan mail, and assuming that the letters in question are being written by different fans, as opposed to the same fans over and over again
…perhaps it could be inferred that every single literate person in Garmsir has been tuning into the station and has been writing letters.
Tuesday, 10, November, 2009 at 10:50 am |
Chaps, thanks for engaging in debate over my short piece. Let just chip in a few points.
Huw rightly questions the validity of my analysis if it is simply based on ancedotal evidence. However, my observations are not simply based on ancedotes. I was in Helmand on secondment to the Stabilisation Unit to conduct a review of the British-led PRT. For our review, we had access to programme documents, project reports, MOE work, previous reviews of the PRT, and the new plans for Helmand. We also interviewed most of the PRT staff, as well as dozens of officers from TFH and TFL. Obviously, I am not able to discuss the content of this review. For this reason, I was careful to write my Guardian piece in terms of my own personal observations.
To answer Pericles, and give a little more detail on the counter-narcotics programme. This is a two pronged programme in Helmand involving the Alternative Livelihoods Prog and a poppy eradication prog. You are entirely right to note there is an issue of sustainaility. You can’t keep giving out free wheat seed. For this reason, this year, the wheat seed was sold at a heavily discounted price to farmers, in order to ensure farmer “buy-in” to the prog. And still, the numbers covered by the prog have increased, up from around 32,000 last year to almost 40,000 this year. Also the number of districts has increased from 8 to 10. Poppy Eradication is less successful. The Poppy Eradication Force (PEF) which is a national prog, was not so successful (because the PEF was very reluctant to operate in the Food Zone area) and very expensive to boot. Last year Gov Mangal also launched his on Governor’s Led Eradication (GLE), supported by the PRT. The GLE covered less ground, but more in the Food Zone, and at a fraction of the cost of the PEF. In any case, it is important to realise that the area of land covered is less important than which land is covered: the focus must be in the Food Zone in order to reinforce the Alternative Livelihoods Prog – ie, the ALP is the carrot and the GLE the stick. Also the concept is to present a credible risk of eradication, so as to encourage farmers to switch to illict crops. Thus, you want to ensure eradication occurs in a number of areas rather than is focused in a few areas: here too, the GLE enjoyed some modest success. Next year, new challenges will present themselves. The PEF has been disbanded for not being cost-effective. So much will depend on GLE, assuming it shall run again this coming year. Wheat seed distribution has been a success, but obviously will need to be re-thought again with sustainability in mind. But the bigger picture from my perspective is that there is growing capacity within the PRT and especially within provincial and local government, to develop, adapt and take forward counter-naroctics progs.
Theo
Tuesday, 10, November, 2009 at 9:22 pm |
The question about metrics and how they track with reality isn’t new to Professor Metz’s discussion.
I guess I’m not exactly persuaded by the fact that the documents reviewed included “programme documents, project reports, MOE work, previous reviews of the PRT, and the new plans for Helmand. We also interviewed most of the PRT staff, as well as dozens of officers from TFH and TFL.”
Pacification is tethered to security, of course, but what metrics were encountered that cut to the heart (or mind) of the insurgency? Have the causative factors that produced the insurgency been addressed, much less charted in a linear progression or regression?
Are we witnessing one square of pacification on a checkerboard? Is there a daytime “checkerboard” to correspond to one ruled by night letters? When we evaluate PRT penetration, is this attitudinal? Or merely a tally of how much money was spent on which projects?
Is there an estimation of how much is raked off the top of the development projects by the insurgents or the Karzai kleptocrats?
Professor Metz is likely right to suspect that what we’re seeing playing out is an reincarnation of the debate over HES — 1) No independent criterion of truth about pacification; 2) Instead, a measurement of the degree of pacification based upon what advisers believe and what government officials say, neither of which are inherently trustworthy even if they’re sincerely rendered.
Are we measuring occupation? Or are we measuring pacification? They’re not the same creature, even if they struggle together in the same cage.
Tuesday, 10, November, 2009 at 11:22 pm |
Since the subject of metrics has come up, and since I suspect we were all disappointed by the lack of genuine measures of effectiveness for the Afghanistan strategy, I wonder if I could ask the blog what they would measure? Which metrics would be best to evaluate an initiative? And how are those metrics to be obtained?
We know important people read this blog, and this, it seems to me, is a key question – lets help them out.
Wednesday, 11, November, 2009 at 9:31 pm |
Whichever initiative is measured it can’t be applied as ‘the model’ for success across a region of Afghanistan, or even a province, or even a district. Pushtun society’s complexity requires a tailored approach on a village by village basis.
Only in the longer term can the occupying force measure its success. Awaiting the locals’ return to depopulated areas and watching them stand up their own security is, in my eyes, the only way the thing will work. Messaging the population that ISAF are not the Soviets might also help. At the present the Taliban are winning the battle for the national will of ISAF nations’ populations, not necessarily the Pushtun people. This fundamental point often gets lost in the media hype.
2009 was always going to be a major hump due to the elections. If ISAF can’t get it right before the next elections they’ve lost.
Monday, 23, November, 2009 at 2:04 pm |
From the LA Times no less:
“Marines in Afghanistan hear a plea: Don’t leave too soon”
http://www.latimes.com/news/nation-and-world/la-fg-afghan-finish23-2009nov23,0,6783682.story
A profound quote from the article:
“You [Westerners] have the watches, but we Afghans have the time,” Gulab Mangal, the governor of Helmand province, has been quoted as saying at a recent gathering.
Monday, 23, November, 2009 at 5:36 pm |
Gulab Mangal wins no points for originality – but still, if he can’t afford a watch as governor of Helmand, I think we’ve got the corruption licked.