Some Answers… And a Few Burning Questions

In between Arabic lessons this morning, queuing for hours to get my visa to India for the Delhi portion of my Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) research, and dining with a few friends who are about to depart the UK and return to their home country of New Zealand I’ve been trying to keep up with the updates streaming in from Mumbai.  A lot has happened since I sat down, pre-dawn, yesterday to crank out my initial thoughts on the Mumbai attacks.

It is becoming increasingly clear that there is both a Pakistani connection and an LeT connection.  I say both because this does not just appear to have been a question of LeT operatives training Indians for the operation or Pakistanis from one of the other groups taking part.  It now seems LeT trained a number of actors and dispatched some of its own operatives as part of a 12 man fidayeen squad – if the Indian media has the number right – to take part in the attack.  This information comes from the interrogation of one of the fidayee captured alive who, according to early reports, is named Ajmal Amir Kamal and hails from the Punjab in Pakistan.

The Punjabi connection is buttressed by early reports that the majority of the chatter between the assailants was in Punjabi.  Apparently they spoke Hindi in public, but Punjabi to one another via radio. People with better connections and who are far more informed than I about the up-to-the-minute developments on the ground were already suggesting to me that this was the case earlier today before the media started reporting it. Reports have been mixed regarding whether two of the other assailants captured early on were Indian or Pakistani, but they have almost uniformly suggested these two were also affiliated with Let.

Kamal allegedly admitted that he was an LeT operative, and that his “minders” were intimately involved in the training and planning for this operation. Kamal is said to have told Indian authorities that he, along with the other members of the 12 man squad, traveled by merchant ship from the port in Karachi to India.  Indian authorities have independently traced the vessel back to Karachi.  Additional reports suggest the assailants transferred from the merchant ship to a hijacked fishing vessel – a crew member of which was found dead –  in order to evade detection by the Indian coast guard.  Anchoring off the coast, they then motored/rowed in where they were met by members of what appears to be a pretty robust local support network.

According to reports from commandos responsible for storming the Taj and Oberoi, the assailants were also equipped with a small arsenal. It seems unlikely that such a cache could have been assembled in India without sending up a bunch of flags, and it is logical to assume the weapons came from Pakistan too.

LeT likely has a maritime capability and has definitely developed a network in India, though it is unclear the degree to which that network is entirely its own or shared with SIMI (and possibly the Indian Mujahideen). It also is not hurting for weaponry, and has the kind of cash necessary to fund an operation of this scale.  Anyone who is saying only al-Qaeda Central could afford this kind of thing is grossly misinformed about the stash LeT has access to.  A fair amount of this cash comes in through the Jama’t-ud-Da’wah, which claims to be completely separate from LeT and almost certainly is not.  The JuD also took in a bundle while providing earthquake relief a few years back, and is likely sitting pretty today financially.  LeT  also has a pretty healthy donor base in the UK and the Gulf, not to mention what it manages to take in locally.

If I’m not mentioning the possibility of assistance, material or otherwise, by the ISI it is not because I am avoiding the subject.  It is because I honestly don’t know what the story it there.  It has always been pretty clear that some links remain between ISI and LeT.  However, how high those links go and who, if anyone from ISI, was involved in this is guesswork at this point.

Before turning to some of the other burning questions I have, I feel obligated to elaborate on something I alluded to on Thursday when I wrote LeT has assiduously avoided directly targeting the West in general and the U.S. in particular.  While the group trumpets its history of fighting in foreign jihads like Bosnia-Herzegovina and Chechnya, its been conspicuously absent from the fight next door in Afghanistan until very recently. It has repeatedly denied any links with al-Qaeda Central and, while it is mentioned often along with a host of other groups when attacks against Western or Pakistani targets are hit, its operatives never seem to be the ones responsible.

It has definitely provided training for those who have targeted the West, most notably Australia where it remains in question whether LeT also had a hand in plotting attacks. Several men arrested by Indian security for plotting attacks against Western and Israeli tourists in Goa are alleged to be LeT operatives. On the whole though, LeT has provided training rather than directing its own operatives to attack al-Qaeda’s Far Enemy.

This makes strategic sense if you figure that LeT had managed to stay in the good graces of the ISI and was thriving in terms of external and local support. Add in the fact that the group is not close to the Taliban and its leaders have known addresses, and it makes sense that LeT would avoid making waves by attacking the West. So specifically picking out Americans, Brits, and Australians – three representatives of Coalition forces in Afghanistan where LeT only showed up recently – is a serious head-scratcher. So if LeT did plan and send its operatives to execute these attacks, this raises the million dollar question:

What changed?

In true academic fashion, I’ll now answer with two key questions that assume that LeT was involved to a degree beyond simply providing logistical or training support.

-    How cohesive is LeT today?  The group allegedly fractured a few years ago, but many insiders think this was subterfuge. Historically, it has been one of the most cohesive groups.  More recently, there has been talk suggesting some elements of LeT is globalizing and that the group might be fracturing.  So are we seeing a change in strategy or a decision by elements formerly associated with LeT acting independly of the core organization?  On a side note, I get that the Jama’t-ud-Da’wah is trying to maintain the whole “we’re a totally different entity than LeT” line, but they now have the only web site in that neighborhood to make absolutely no reference to the attacks.  Seriously?  Come on people.

-    Was this a reaction to the internal Pakistani situation or just the continuation of a trend?  The Pakistani decision to dissolve the ISI’s political wing might have been interpreted as writing on the wall that the good times were coming to an end, although reports suggest the wing has been terminated but staff have not yet been disbanded.  Zardari’s been pushing peace with Indian pretty hard as well, and LeT may have felt an attack of this magnitude was necessary to re-polarize the two countries. Not that they were exactly bosom buddies… but LeT is really only happy when everyone in Pakistan is calling for unmitigated war on India. On the other hand, LeT and others have been increasingly preoccupied with striking India’s economy.  Seems they may have learned a thing or two from AQC after all.  These attacks definitely seem geared to harming India’s economic engine, along with curtailing tourism.  Hitting specific Westerners may have been a way of ensuring additional press, though it seems a bit gratuitous.  This is an attack like no other in history, its not like they needed that extra bit of PR.

Those are the two main questions I’d like to see answered.  And I’m definitely going to ask everyone I meet when I’m in Pakistan in two weeks time.  But I doubt any answers will be forthcoming.

Before I close, I feel obligated to add a quick personal note. As a friend wrote to me earlier today, the next few days will surely produce stories of drama and courage.  Unfortunately, they will also witness the assignment of blame to an entire religion for the actions of a few twisted souls.  That sentiment has crept into the comments on this blog, as well as a few others I’ve read.  Sadly, no major religion is without those who misconstrue its tenets to rationalize their violence. It is with these actors, and not a religion or the majority of its peaceful adherents, with whom responsibility rests.

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