It’s tough to make predictions, especially about the future*

The talk of the blogosphere at the moment would seem to be Andrew Krepinevich’s CSBA report An Army at the Crossroads which I encourage you to read. The gist of it is that the Army (he is talking about the US Army but the issue is as germane to all or most modern armed forces, including Britain’s),  

In posturing itself for full-spectrum operations… appears to have placed its institutional center of gravity squarely in the area of conventional warfare. This is true both for the Army’s core modernization program, the Future Combat Systems, and its force structure… The Army’s force structure also appears to be far more oriented on conventional operations than seems warranted.

That the army’s force structure (plus its institutional outlook) is oriented towards conventional warfare is to me undisputable. What is controversial is the degree to which this is warranted. We here at KOW are in some dispute over that point, so it should be no surprise that this is a matter of serious debate elsewhere. My view on the matter is fairly well set. If you’re interested you can read it in my article ‘Redesigning Land Forces for Wars Amongst the People.’ Here’s the short version:

… what should concern us most about the preparedness of armies for ‘wars amongst the people’ is not the technological sophistication of its equipment, where the edge for Western armies is already good, but the training, quality, and quantity of its personnel. In the end, having good tactical technique counts for more than having good technology.

Above all, we must concentrate on expanding and improving our light infantry. Referring to the failures of Western forces from the end of the First Indo-China War to the fall of Saigon in 1975 John English wrote, ‘The one common theme that runs through these very different events is the fact that victory was achieved by the side that devoted the greatest share of its resources, and, in particular, its human resources, to its infantry.’ By that measure we have a long way to go, for as Bing West has pointed out, the United States now has as many combat aircraft as it does infantry squads. This is not a sound footing on which to meet the challenges of future wars.

Armies need more and better infantry first and foremost – not just more ‘boots on the ground’ but smarter boots. In Special Forces there has always been a distinction between the unconventional warriors who focused on the techniques of counterinsurgency, working closely with locals and generally placing great stock in communication skills and good political sense as opposed to fighting – though that must be a part of it; long-range reconnaissance specialists focused on observation and remaining undetected; and raiders, specialists in short, sharp, close-quarter battle – ‘hard men’ in the vernacular. The need for specialists in reconnaissance and raiding has not diminished at all; in fact, it is greater than ever. But the fact is that irregular warfare is the new norm, not the exception, and therefore the appropriate skills for waging it are properly in the province of the regular forces.

In a thoughtful recent analysis of American military reform Mackubin Owen Thomas described the current Army force structure as a ‘dumbbell with  heavy forces on one end and light forces on the other. The former are lethal and capable once in the theatre of operations, but slow to deploy, while the latter are responsive but lack lethality’. The US Army’s answer to this dilemma is the creation of a medium-weight force. In this paper I have argued that this is a mistake.

There is nothing wrong with a dumbbell-shaped force if the balance of force types matches the balance of necessary mission types. The problem is that it does not at present, as is recognized in the Quadrennial Defense Review 2006, which highlights the imbalance between the growing irregular challenges and the current capability portfolio.

The bulk of the land force is focused on regular, inter-state war-fighting of like against like, a task which technology is making possible to do with relatively few ground troops working in conjunction with precision fires delivered by air and naval assets; but the main threat is posed by irregular opponents in ‘wars amongst the people’, the fighting of which calls for skills and mindsets that are still too often seen as a niche or separate capability. If the problem of meeting current and future threats could be solved merely by taking, holding or destroying this or that objective, then the current arrangement of forces could be continued. The problem, however, is winning ‘wars amongst the people’ and for that, the battlefield must be repopulated by soldiers whose training and mindset is inherently opposite to the ‘never put a man where you can put a bullet’ logic of the Revolution in Military Affairs and its derivative concepts. If land forces in future are going to have to fight a succession of big ‘small wars’, then the ‘big army’ is going to have to shoulder the burden of nation-building, recognize it as the core and substance of warwinning, and compose its forces accordingly.

I think that Krepinevich and I are probably pretty close in our opinions on this point. For instance, he writes:

The Army has specialized forces. It will need more. The Service has for decades fielded forces specialized for airborne operations and air assault operations. Of course, the Army also has its Special Forces, expert in a range of irregular warfare operations. It has forces specially designed for high-end warfare, and plans to continue in this vein with the FCS BCTs, which the Army properly recognized are “optimized” for conventional warfare. These kinds of forces are designed to surge on short notice to address conventional contingencies. While it was once argued that such “general-purpose” forces could readily shift gears to handle contingencies at the lower end of the conflict spectrum, the evidence of Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq suggests otherwise. Moreover, the Army’s new doctrine confirms the triumph of real-world experience over wishful thinking. Thus what the Army lacks are forces designed to surge in the event of a major contingency at the lower end of the conflict spectrum, as well as forces designed to prevent such a contingency from arising in the first place.

But read it for yourself-it’s an interesting, well-thought out and highly topical report. Also catching my eye this week was this National Intelligence Council report Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World which has caught quite a bit of press but is worth reading, at least skimming, in full. Some of the points which have been picked up in the press are pretty alarming–the risk of nuclear weapons use will rise (while remaining ‘low’), resource wars, migration and instability exacerbated by climate change and population growth will proliferate–others have not featured so much in the press but, in my view, should have. For example:

[What] are the outcomes of demographic challenges facing Europe, Japan, and even Russia. In none of these cases does demography have to spell destiny with less regional and global power an inevitable outcome. Technology, the role of immigration, public health improvements, and laws encouraging greater female participation in the economy are some of the measures that could change the trajectory of current trends pointing toward less economic growth, increased social tensions, and possible decline.

In general, however, the thrust of the report would seem to confirm a view of the future in which conflict is increasingly irregular and/or hybrid–a view which reinforces Krepinevich’s report on the future of the Army.One should not expect from from Anthony Cordesmann at the Center for Strategic and International Studies a brief report. 143 slide PowerPoint presentations are more his style: The Iraq War: Progress in the Fighting and Security. Do not be put off, however; this is chock-full full of interesting and useful observations and data about Iraq and Afghanistan and the changes they have wrought on the US Army. The key point is it’s not over yet, despite enormous progress. This, it seems to me, is one very important answer to a question posed by General Petraeus ‘What did you learn from Iraq that might be transferable to Afghanistan?’ quoted at Small Wars Journal where they are having a debate on ‘Afghanistan: What Lessons to Apply from Iraq?‘ These are the key points drawn from the discussion:

(1) Basic COIN principles of protecting the population, connecting the government with the people and permanently isolating insurgents from the population apply in either conflict but must be adapted for local conditions.

(2) Shift emphasis from top-down (strong central government) to bottom-up (locally provided security) to leverage tribal structure in Afghanistan.

(3) Seek neither to apply directly the Anbar strategy to Afghanistan nor simply surge more forces; more troops (2–4 BCTs) are unlikely to measurably change the effort with the current strategy.

(4) Increase efforts in advisory and PRT initiatives to enhance Afghan capabilities.

(5) Put an Afghan face on all CERP. Use Jirgas to solicit needs from the local populace to bolster local government entities.

I agree with all of the above while hastening to add that all insurgencies are different so don’t overdraw the lessons and that caution is doubled when you bear in mind that Iraq isn’t won yet. Petraeus has said the same thing, not incidentally. Also on Small Wars Journal in Afghanistan related news is the release by John Nagl of a public version of the ISAF campaign plan. It’s short and sweet and, it seems to me, a welcome illustration of a greater understanding of the environment than has generally heretofore been evident. If we are on a learning curve in Afghanistan at least we are on the ascending part of it–whether we can learn enough and fast enough to matter is a good question. Actually having a plan is a nice step on its own. That’s another core principle of counterinsurgency. In the spirit of the post below I shall quote Thompson’s Defeating Communist Insurgency again:  

The government must have an overall plan. This plan must cover not just the security measures and military operations. It must include all political, social, economic, administrative, police and other measures which have a bearing on the insurgency. Above all it must clearly define roles and responsibilities to avoid duplication of effort and to ensure that there are no gaps in the government’s fiueld of action.

It is essential, too, that there should be a proper balance between the military and the civil effort, with complete coordination in all fields. Otherwise a situation will arise in which military operations produce no lasting results because they are unsupported by civil follow-up action. Similarly, civilian measures, particularly in areas disputed with the insurgents, are a waste of time if they are unsupported by military operations to provide the necessary protection.

Does the campaign plan do all that? There’s not enough of the public version to say. No doubt the planners are aware of the need for it. What’s really exasperating is the void of strategy in which the planners are operating. A plan isn’t much use without an aim; its like a rope bridge with nothing to fix one end to; it may be a great bridge but you’re still going to end up in the bottom of the gorge if you dare to walk it. I fear this is the case with Afghanistan where I have yet to hear a compelling articulation of the why we are there which aligns with the seriousness (to judge from the resources devoted to it) that politicians give it.  According to PM Gordon Brown last year:

Let me, on the morning of the capture of Musa Qaleh, praise the professionalism and resolve of our forces in recent days. They have helped defeat the insurgents and, in a vital district of Afghanistan, restored peace. Let me make it clear at the outset that as part of a coalition we are winning the battle against the Taliban insurgency. We are isolating and eliminating the leadership of the Taliban. We are not negotiating with them.

38 countries have come together with the people and Government of Afghanistan to rebuild the failed state, to prevent the return of the Taliban and to root out al-Qaeda. I can tell the House that Britain will continue to meet our obligations and honour our commitments, discharging our duties to this task and to the people of Afghanistan.

Having been reviewing our strategy since July, I now want to announce the next stage. It is a long-term and comprehensive framework for security, political, social and economic development for Afghanistan… Our objective is to defeat the insurgency by isolating and eliminating its leadership. I make it clear that we will not enter any negotiations with those people. I have also made it clear on countless occasions, most recently in Afghanistan, that our objective is to root out those who preach and practise violence and murder in support of men and women of peace. President Karzai’s message to former insurgents is that if they are prepared to renounce violence, abide by the constitution and respect human rights, there is a place for them in the legitimate society and economy of Afghanistan. He and his Ministers told me this week that some 5,000 fighters have already laid down their arms. We will support President Karzai and his Government in their efforts to reconcile all parties to Afghanistan’s democratic constitution.

So, it would seem our aim is to rebuild Afghanistan, to prevent the return of the Taliban, and root out Al Qaeda, in addition to reconciling Afghans to democracy along the way. It’s not that I disagree with these goals necessarily. They are very ambitious, however, and sad to say we are not making much traction on any of them at present. Perhaps it is time for a reassessment? In any case it would be good if the government would explain why this is integral to our own security because in the absence of such a case I can predict that we will continue on the current chronically under-resourced path to failure.  

*With thanks to Yogi Berra