It’s time for some Change in Afghanistan

Despite some misgivings, I welcome the election of Barack Obama because I suspect that the chances for a substantial change of direction and reinforcement of the campaign in Afghanistan are slightly better with him as President. Four months ago US Army general Barry McCaffrey published an After Action Report on the state of the Afghan campaign based on interviews conducted at SHAPE in Brussels and with various officials in Kabul. It’s quite a sobering read. In a nutshell, it says:

• The country is atrociously governed
• Afghans do not want the Taliban back
• But the insurgency will come to a head soon, probably 2009
• The tactical situation is in stalemate
• More troops and resources are urgently required
• The command structure of the operation is an uncoordinated and disunited shambles

Obama has already indicated that he will shift American resources to Afghanistan. What he must do now is pressure those European allies who are not pulling their weight now to get with the programme. The argument of some countries that the public distaste with the Bush administration has precluded their deeper involvent is no longer valid. The mission is inadequately resourced and it is nearing crunch time. 

It’s not just resources that are required, however. It’s a whole new programme. Consider Sir Robert Thompson’s 5 Principles of COIN:

1. Act within the law–because governmental legitimacy inheres from being seen to do so. This is not only a matter of eschewing torture, brutality or collective punishment but also of trimming corruption which merely adds another layer of friction between the people and the government;
2. Have a clear political aim because that is what you need to meaningfully refute insurgent propaganda and narratives;
3. Have an overall plan because that is what you need in order to align the efforts of all involved—civil and military, intelligence and police (not to mention NGOs which Thompson wasn’t worried about);
4. Give priority to defeating the insurgent’s campaign of political subversion, not the physical destruction of the insurgent per se because an insurgency is like an iceberg. The armed guerrillas above the surface are what you see but it is the massive bulk of the population which supports them that is their true strength; and,
5. Secure the base areas of the population and as the insurgency weakens and the government strengthens expand them in an ‘oil-spot’ manner.

Which of these principles do you think is evident in the current campaign. Acting with the law? Yes, I think for the most part. But it’s not generating much legitimacy and the endemic corruption of the Afghan government is a massive burden to overcome. Clear political aim? I have been asking for a while now what is it that we want from Afghanistan and I’m still not sure. Have an overall plan? Well, there is a plan, but is it followed/feasible with 37 states involved in its enactment? Defeat insurgent subversion? Despite numerous statements that the information operation is the key I think we still have not managed to integrate the ‘virtual dimension’ into our thinking about the levels of war (strategic, operational, tactical). As a result, not to put too fine a point, the Talban is beating the hell out of us in the hearts and minds messaging game. The thing which distinguishes the ‘neo-Taliban’ from the ‘old Taliban more than anything else is the former’s embrace of technology, specifically information technology, for which they developed a passion completely at odds with the television-smashing, music-banning zealots of the past.

The early years of the Taliban’s rule in Afghanistan were not known for their press freedom. Technology was unwelcome, images of human beings uncovered considered apostate and world opinion largely irrelevant. Yet, since December 2006 the information environment has unexpectedly become a key component of their campaign, demonstrating both a surprising agility of mind and a developed grasp of the role of information in their heavily outgunned insurgency. This properly began in late 2006 when reports began circulating that the Taliban had sent representatives to Iraq, not to view the insurgency per se but instead to learn how AQ’s video production arm—Al-Sahab—depicted that insurgency to its followers, both through conventional and emerging media. Steve Tathum, ‘Hearts and Minds: Time to Think Differently’, Naval Review, Vol. 96, No. 4 (November 2008), pp. 329-30, not on-line, unfortunately, I urge you all to go to your university library to read it).

How about securing the population? T.E. Lawrence wrote this in Seven Pillars of Wisdom–the story his involvement in the Arab Revolt against the Turks in the Middle East during the First World War:

Armies were like plants, immobile as a whole, firm-rooted, nourished through long stems to the head. We might be a vapour, blowing where they listed. Our kingdoms lay in each man’s mind, and as we wanted nothing material to live on, so we might offer nothing material to the killing. It seemed a regular soldier might be helpless without a target, owning only what he sat on, and subjugating only what, by order, he could poke his rifle at. (p. 182)

I fear that we at present in Afghanistan are rather like the Turks in Arabia controlling only what we sit on. More troops would help. So too would more helicopters and no doubt more of many more things. It is good that the United States appears to be ‘on the case’ but Europe too should pony up.