To the managers go the spoils…

Behind all the mousse between Carlton-Smith and Gates, there is a fundamental question.  Is war winnable?  By abstracting the issue (that is, not talking specifically about any one war in particular) we may interrogate it more effectively. 

So, philosophically speaking, we can say that there are wars that are winnable (like WWII) and others that are not (like the DR Congo, perhaps).  The difference between the two types is not solely because of ‘morale’ or ‘troop levels’.  There would be something constituitive of each type of war that made it winnable or not; that is, there would be something in the very make-up of a conflict that made it impossible for ANYONE to win, in the sense of conventional victory.  This would be quite different from a situation where it was impossible for OUR SIDE to win.  In these cases, the lack of victory might be chalked up to incompetence, lack of resources, etc.  Are we fighting a winnable war, or not?  Justify your answer. 

Another way to look at the problem would be from the perspective of asymmetry; more specifically, an asymmetry of function.  If OUR SIDE saw the conflict in instrumental terms (that is, a process meant to achieve some objective or end) our victory would depend on our reaching that objective.  In the liberal tradition of the post-Enlightenment West, we fight in order to achieve something (land, control, freedom, etc.)  Here, conflicts are usually over opposition to those objectives.  Who gets the land?  Who gains control?  Who enjoys freedom?  Since these questions are the foundation for politics (recall the famous definition of politics: ‘who gets, what, how and why’), war is easily understood as a manner for determining these questions, and therefore, an extension of politics by other means. 

However, there are other traditions.  Consider just one: Franz Fanon’s understanding of conflict as a form of collective catharsis.  Here violence is expressive not instrumental.  It is not designed to achieve things: war is a continuation not of politics, but of identity.    If OUR SIDE is fighting an instrumental war and the THE OTHER SIDE is fighting an expressive one, what does victory mean?  There may be occasions where both sides can ‘win’ or occasions where neither can ‘win’. 

Lastly, if we focus on Carlton-Smith’s idea of management, rather than victory, we step into the world of ‘security-as-risk-management’.  Conflicts are not solved, but rather dealt with, kept at acceptable levels, compromises made and lived with.  This perspective includes within it the idea that attempts at solution often carry with them unintended consequences.  Enter, for example, the Mujahadeen consequence of the anti-Soviet solution in Afghanistan of the 1980s.  The focus necessarily becomes one of determining, as best as one can, the ‘least worst option’, rather than striving for ‘unconditional victory’.  (As a matter of fact, if we look back in history we can see that the cases of victory, such as WWI and WWII, also carried with them consequences for later management, although we tend not to look at them in that manner). 

So, the challenge is, for those in the Carlton-Smith camp as much for those in the Robert Gates camp, is to define what ‘acceptable’ is.  I recall listening to one colonel at the US Army War College describing what the US Army’s exit criteria were for in their intervention in the humanitarian crisis in the Great Lakes region of Africa.  It was pegged to two indices: one was the number of litres of potable water available.  The other was the number of deaths due to colera and other diseases per day.  The exit date was determined when the number of litres rose to 10,000 and the number of deaths dropped to 400.  The room was silent as it all seemed a little ‘calculating’ and callous.  Besides, those figures spoke of outputs, not outcomes: was life actually better once those numbers were reached? Did they mean that the crisis was over?  BUT what was the alternative?  TOTAL VICTORY?  An infinite number of litres?  Zero deaths from disease?  For how long? Etc.  As unpalatable as it may seem, in wars amongst the people, management may be the least worst option.  The quicker we appreciate that, in places like Iraq and Afghanistan, the quicker we can design a strategy to get us there. 

Hoping for (and occasionally declaring) victory, but doing so without a viable plan for achieving it, may sound optimistic and go over well in Peoria.  In reality, it is nuttier than Chinese chicken salad.