It is a close run thing to find ‘the most worrying aspect’ of this article on a recent ambush of Canadian troops in Afghanistan. With so many things to choose from, it is hard to know where to begin:
1. The increasingly agressive and effective approach of the Taliban? There attacks are hard hitting, well chosen and well prepared. While they remain ‘ambushes’ and not ‘meeting engagments’, their impact is considerable. NATO forces, well equipped, armed and armoured for the most part, are still vulnerable to the arsenal of the Taliban. This attack is the at least the third time that the same piece of ground had to be fought over. Not quite as rosy a picture as some would have us believe.
2. The fact that people are surprised by these events? Did the generals not read any history of the Soviet occupation at all? The tactics and successes of the Taliban are not dissimilar to those employed and enjoyed, in the same terrain, in previous periods.
3. The fact that the local government is ‘well connected’ to the Taliban? While not surprising, it certainly is worrying. Since–as everyone knows and reminds everyone else everyday–NATO and the US are only there to support the local and central governments, there really is a ‘problem’ when elements of those same governments are connected with the bad guys. Makes you wonder what the limits of possibility are for progress there.
Maybe, given these worrying developments, COIN is impossible?
Sunday, 7, September, 2008 at 1:33 pm |
Afghanistan is an entirely different proposition from Iraq. Many important things are different, such as terrain and the culture of the population. I would expect much higher troop levels to have any chance at success. Yet supply and maintenance is much more costly here. This is leaving out Pakistani involvement. And this is not the only trouble spot.
This war will eventually become much, much larger before it is finally over.
Sunday, 7, September, 2008 at 2:48 pm |
The question is to what extent even the current effort in AFghanistan is sustainable. Especially the fuel-supply logistics are worrysome, now that Russia has officially been declared an enemy (and we all have become Georgians) NATO can not plan on the northern route being a fallback option. Wich leaves only Pakistan, since airsupply is not possible. And that is not such a obvious ally anymore, given recent US attacks into Pakistan and a lot of other geopolitical considerations the Pakis have to consider.
The question of to what extent the FM 3-24 is appliccable in Afghanistan is a very very very good one, another is if the fundament we have built in Afghanistan has any shred of legitimacy in the population: The warlords we have put in control of the country was the very same that the Taleban came as a reaction to back in the 80s, why should their rule be any more popular now? Some of us talked at the start of the invasion about the need to hold a 15-20 year perspective. When I consider the fact that the west in 7 years has spent approx half of what the chinese spent on the Olympics in rebuilding Afghanistan, the mind completely boggles.