‘Why can’t the Americans stop this?’

So what does success and ultimate victory mean in Afghanistan, for the Taliban and for us?

I’m always amazed by the spirit of international forces fighting in Afghanistan with few resources in wildly unfavourable circumstances.

Equally, I would echo the views of the Faceless Bureaucrat below, that some recent statements by ISAF commanders suggest a disturbing partial (or mis)understanding of the conflict.

Consider this:
The road from Kabul to Kandahar is even more treacherous, according to other drivers. “If the Afghan Army isn’t there, a fly cannot pass,” said Bashir, a lorry owner, pointing to the scorched shells of three vehicles he retrieved from a Taleban raid on the Kandahar road last week. Of 60 lorries, 13 were destroyed, he said. “Why can’t the Americans stop this?”

The Taliban’s recent move is to surround Kabul politically and militarily to menace Nato logistics convoys. This technique is rooted in Afghanistan’s bloody history.

But crucially, why does this matter? Consider these statements:

In the 1980s it was Soviet forces encircled in Kabul by the Mujahidin. They withrew in 1989. In 1996 the Taleban took Kabul after capturing Wardak and Jalalabad and blockading the capital. Isaf, the International Security Assistance Force, says that circumstances are different today: it has superior air support and logistics to the Soviets and the Taleban… Des Browne, the British Defence Secretary, this week dismissed recent Taleban raids near Kabul as indiscriminate. “In no sense have they created, or can they make, a strategic threat to the Government of Afghanistan,” he said. Brigadier-General Richard Blanchette, an Isaf spokesman, said: “We’re fine for fuel and food. With the air power we have, and the quality of troops on the ground, there is no way they can win.”

Obviously these remarks are partly geared to show self-confidence. But they also leave a lot of stuff out. Just because the Taliban is not able to overrun the capital, deny food and fuel to our forces, doesn’t mean they don’t pose a profound political threat to the Afghan government and ISAF’s project.

Unless I’m seriously misreading things, this isn’t so much about capturing Kabul physically, even though the ability to capture terrain will matter a great deal eventually. It seems to be part of an overarching bid for credibility. The logic of this strategy is found in the lorry owner’s question, ‘Why can’t the Americans stop this?’ The Taliban’s mere ability to threaten convoys shows strength and resilience, and an ability to regenerate itself. The American-led coalition’s inability to stop them suggests they lack sufficient will or ability for Afghans to take them seriously.

Ultimately, the Taliban want to convince the locals that they will always return, that the foreigners will leave, and that ultimate victory is inevitably theirs. No matter how much attrition they suffer, the war is a wandering path to a fixed end: Afghans have the Taliban in their future. Pragmatic survivalists (and who wouldn’t be one, having lived through that country’s history?) decide to align themselves with the more credible force, or at least hedge their bets. The Taliban build up a sense of fatalist momentum and a base amongst the population.

They also market themselves as an alternative government. In areas where Kabul’s writ does not run, their war is partly a judicial one, as they provide swift justice and law. Just as in the past, they can successfully pose as the bringers of order out of chaos. A counter-state is effectively established, both as a lived reality and as an idea.

So once again we go back to history. ISAF may claim that its air support and logistics exempt it from historical patterns. But these potent weapons might be helping to mislead them about the nature of the war itself. Who knows what’s going to happen. But its bleak reading at the moment all right.