Further thoughts on Russo-Georgia War 2008

(h/t Adam Elkus at Rethinking Security) Leave aside the wider strategic ramifications of the Russo-Georgia War for a moment to consider the tactical and operational methods employed. As Pat has pointed out interstate warfare is not dead: ‘we still live in a world where powerful states may attack other states if they think vital interests are at stake, if they think it will work, and if they think they can get away with it.’ But the way in which Russia has conducted this attack is new and significant. Consider that Russia has combined:

1. Cyberattack (previously used against Estonia and Ukraine) on Georgia;
2. A well-developed Information Operation which early on established a genocide narrative and the parallel with Kosovo;
3. The close coordination of operations of irregular, non-state forces with regular, state forces; with,
4. A conventional all-arms military assault.

Some are bound to say that this war shows that the ‘COIN-dinistas’ are wrong–conventional war is alive and well and, therefore, we ought get back to core capability tout de suite. I beg to differ. Because the method above is in essence what Frank Hoffman calls ‘hybrid warfare‘ which is the use of multiple type of attack simultaneously and flexibly in a sophisticated way. It is not that regular interstate war is dead; it is that even states will employ irregular means because they work. Put differently, regular warfare is looking increasingly irregular.

Getting back to the strategic impact, however, a number of figures have reacted to the war along these lines: ‘thank God we didn’t admit Georgia to NATO.’ Others reckon that if we had admitted Georgia to NATO then Russia would not have attacked it. Sadly, actual policy oscillates between these poles offering moral and rhetorical support to the countries of the ‘near abroad’ but when the chips are down declining substantive material and military aid–naturally, for otherwise we would be in a shooting war with Russia which not incidentally is the second largest nuclear power. The gist of it, IMHO, is that for Georgia and–more importantly, Ukraine–it is sort of plausible to imagine NATO membership but not with their present borders and current domestic political make-up. Would Belgium, for instance, fight for Ukraine’s sovereignty over Sevastopol? Highly doubtful. But Russia would; I think that’s the main message of this war.