Taking stock of the British Army

Here are two articles that I meant to comment on earlier but have been distracted by the writing of a research grant bid (from which I am now skiving). For some time now I (and no doubt many others) have been of the opinion that Britain when it comes to strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan, in general in fact, Britain has no one in the driver’s seat. The magnificent bravery, dedication , sacrifice, and professional skill of the Army is not in question. But other things decidedly are. For instance, what is the long-term plan for Afghanistan?  What are the troops there to do exactly? Deny sanctuary to Al Qaeda there? Done. They’ve moved to Pakistan.  ‘Stabilize’ and ‘democratize’ the place, build a viable economy there based on something other than narcotics? OK… but if so have we the patience and resources to take on this multi-decades effort? Not at present and it doesn’t look to me as though the government is seriously considering the imbalance between its declared aims and its existing means. Is it worth it? One thing which is becoming clear in the UK is the tension between the expeditionary campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan and the domestic campaign to stem the rising tide of radicalization of Muslim youth which the Home Office thus far has made a hash of.

It seems clear to me that the wheels are going to come off at some point. The two Times articles linked below suggests how wobbly the armed forces are getting . In Fighting two separate wars takes Army close to breaking point Michael Evans writes:

The sense of foreboding within the Armed Forces is spreading. As one senior defence source told The Times, the bottom line is that “if these two campaigns continue on this scale, it could break the Army”.

The source, who was intimately involved in planning the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, added: “The original design was to draw down in Iraq in order to build up in Afghanistan. This was at the heart of the strategy but it simply hasnt happened, which is why the Forces are overstretched, not so much on the bayonets [combat troops] side but in all the support areas, such as engineers and signals and logistics.”

This rings true with stories I am hearing from students and acquaintances who are struggling with an unprecedented tempo of operations which is compounded by a sense that while the Army is very much at war and fully engaged, society as a whole holds much more ambivalent and contradictory opinions about the war, its conduct and aims. Therefore, not surprising to read in Half of all British servicemen say they want to quit that:

The first survey to assess attitudes across the Armed Forces reveals unprecedented levels of concern over equipment, morale and pay.

The research was conducted by the Ministry of Defence and involved more than 24,000 military personnel.

It found that the sense of overcommitment means that 47 per cent of soldiers and army officers think regularly of handing in their resignations.

Interestingly, the levels of dissatisfaction are higher in the RAF and RN than they are in the Army which seems counterintuitive. There is also a distinction between individual morale (which is high) and perception of morale in their service (which is very low) which I find intriguing.

On a tangentially-related note, the biggest story in the UK this summer is not about the war it’s about a perceived burgeoning of Knife Crime. An interesting part of the hand-wringing ‘what to do about it’ debate is the theme of the return of national service of some type. The idea here being that a bit of discipline, training, socialization in the military might be a better use of the time and outlet of energy of some young people than the current regime of petty criminality, marathon Nintendo-playing, and recreational stabbings. Actually, I approve of the idea for lots of good social reasons but as a solution to the problems of the Army described above it’s a non-starter.