Kilcullen on Small Wars Journal
I didn’t notice this essay on Small Wars Journal until the link was sent to me by a student as I’ve been busy second marking all day (blah!). Kilcullen is always worth reading and this piece on roads and counterinsurgency is fascinating and thought-provoking. Go read it.
My view: much common sense here, particularly the recognition that much of Afghan rural tribal society views road construction with apprehension if not hostilty because experience tells them, a) they represent the encroachment of central authority and, b) while trucks with goods roll down them (which is good) so too do tanks and troop carriers (which is viscerally evident to Afghans). So I’m struck by the potentiality that either:
a) This is wrong, Afghans don’t think roadsd are a two-edged sword;
b) Kilcullen is wrong;
c) The theory is normally correct, but the political management which Kilcullen refers to has been so skillful that it has effectively been neutralised;
d) The theory was correct but has been rendered outdated by changing circumstances in the country over the past few years. If that’s the case, of course, the situation is arguably reversible, which is less positive;
e) The road-building project has worked in this particular area, but will not in fact enjoy general applicability; or,
f) some combination of the above.
My thoughts on this are strongly informed buy the student who forwarded the link who really ought to join this blog.
Saturday, 26, April, 2008 at 7:19 am |
An interesting read. The whole idea of ‘lines of communication’ is often studied at the strategic level (especially within naval studies) and clearly goes beyond ‘roads is roads’. Roads (and railroads), after all, transformed Europe into a modern, administered polity, rather than a series of unconnected localities. Kilcullen does a nice job of taking the analysis down to the operational and tactical level.
Not that Kilcullen is advocating a 100% focus on roads and road-building, but I think there are some cautionary remarks to be made:
1. Roads are (here it comes) a two-way street. If they become too much of a focus, then they serve to restrict freedom of movement of the population and COIN forces. As much as they facilitiate travel, they can also serve to canalise it. The German forces working in Yugoslavia in WWII found that they controlled the roads, and not much else. Roman road mastery did not deter Hannibal.
2. If roads become elevated to the level whereby there are the icons of success and progress, then they become a vulnerability, as well as a strength. Perhaps IEDs will give way to simple sabotage, rendering sections of the roads impassable, or at least reducing their mobility enhancing effect. If you build it, you have to protect it.
3. Mega-projects (like the Afghan Ring Road) are fraught with other political problems too. Who builds them? Who benefits from the construction contracts? In some cases, all that is achieved is that corruption and warlordism/mafia-ism, powerful ammunition in the narratives of the insurgents, are replicated, yet again. The ‘electrification’ of villages in Bosnia provides an interesting counter-example. Not every village could be hooked up to the grid, even now. The frustration over ‘who gets power’ and who is left out is palpable. And guess what? A friendly Iranian or Saudi NGO will help you get your village on the grid, and all they ask in return is for permission to fix up the mosque while they are at it.
4. If they are built by the ‘occupying powers’ they may serve well enough during the occupation, but may turn fallow when turned over to the local administrators later. Will there be funding for maintenance and upkeep? Or are they a ‘quick fix’, with little enduring benefit?
While the tactical and immediate benefits of increased mobility should not be taken for granted, there is a deeper concern here. Roads are not just roads, to be sure. Are they a symbol of ‘modernisation’, of progress, of Westernisation? The globe is littered with colonial and World Bank projects (roads, dams, canals, etc) that were supposed to have a civilising/development effect. Many are failures, in spite of themselves. What is their attraction: Are they merely something that is easily measured? Are we going to replace the “body count” with the “tarmac tally”? Like the steamboats in Conrad’s Heart of Darkness, roads in Afghanistan may be metaphors, and not just positive ones at that.
Saturday, 26, April, 2008 at 3:57 pm |
[...] attention. First, the small posts that constitute most discussion on the Internet. For example, this post at Kings of War (the blog of Department of War Studies, King’s College [...]
Thursday, 8, May, 2008 at 3:27 am |
[...] This led to much debate, concurrence and/or criticism at Registan.net, [My] State Failure Blog, Kings of War and Abu Durkha [...]
Tuesday, 2, December, 2008 at 4:27 pm |
Well, I heartily agree with Mr. Kilcullen.
The question is: “how can you govern a place if you cannot go there?”
If a state has (by definition) monopoly of force in a region, then, regions unreachable for the state are state-less.
I’d say that many people is angry with their government, heck, even in America. Only where the government is out of reach for the people, that angry develops into insurgence.
I agree with the idea that roads by themselves are not enough. Based on my experience on colombian roads, I would say that you have to follow these principles:
- The government has to be conscious that they are one of its main tools against insurgence. That is, the road has to be used by government agencies to get there first.
I’m talking of a network of roads for the defense of the nation: for example, bridges have to be supplemented by river-passes able to withstand a tank.
- Building shouldn’t be done by military or central government cronies, much less by foreign contractors, but by local contractors.
- Roads have to be mantained by the local population.
- Locals doing maintenance work has to be taught how to become an enterprise (albeit a small one).
- The network has to be designed with war in mind. Taking the example of a previous blogger, tanks have to be able to reach the frontier, even if birds don’t.
- The road investment has to be accompanied by car affordability for the population and investment in a comfortable bus fleet. What’s the use of building, I don’t know, acqueducts, if nobody has a toilet? Same goes for roads.
People could study the ideas of Jane Jacobs, the famous urbanist: the development of agriculture did NOT create cities. Cities created agriculture because they made wealthier their rural surroundings. Where you don’t have a road network, that influence from cities into the rural zones is lost. If the influence of the state is lost, someone replaces the vacuum of power.
Mr. Betz argues that the relationship between roads and insurgence is tenuous. I don’t think so, so I will try to find how strong is. I’ll come back.