The Afghan Taliban, notorious for their religious conservatism, are actually cultural realists. That is, they develop and change their strategy by remaking their culture. Culture emerges not so much as a clear script for action, but as a potent weapon that they instrumentalise for strategic purposes.
In adapting to invasion, the Taliban have disagreed on both methods and values. Just as they once disagreed on whether to shelter Bin Laden, since 2001 they have debated whether to mount aggressive attacks or fight a ‘war of the flea’, bleeding the enemy over time.
And they have reshaped their view of suicide bombing, a method unknown to Afghanistan before 2001. Previously some Taliban argued that wearing an explosive vest was cowardly, as the insurgent should fight face-to-face, while others argued that it would alienate Afghan civilians. At one point, a Taliban faction placed an advertisement in a Kandahar newspaper promising to punish those responsible for a suicide bombing and blaming it on foreign fighters.
But this has now changed, as the Taliban employ the more avowed fedayeen (those ready to sacrifice their lives) as suicide bombers, whom they call ‘Mullah Omar’s missiles.’ This method of ‘martyrdom operations’ is a significant innovation. It violates the sentiments of Afghans, for whom suicide and suicide bombing was an affront to Islam. Taliban religious leaders developed a convenient re-interpretation of the Koran to justify this new tactic, bending sacred narratives to their will:
Several of the insurgents said they couldn’t remember the specific reference to Islamic holy texts used by their teachers to justify the idea, but some made reference to a story about a Muslim army that existed in the seventh century, during the lifetime of the prophet Mohammed.
‘There is a story from the time of the prophet,’ one insurgent said.
‘There were two companions of the prophet, and…they were attacking a place [where] the walls were high, so they could not jump over the wall…One lifted the other over the wall and he died in the attack. He knew he would be killed, but it was his duty.’
This is a classic instance of the mutability of culture. Mullahs act as authority figures, or keepers of strategic culture, find within their tradition a potent narrative, and instruct the mostly illiterate flock that the method befits Islamic martyrdom. And within the discourse of piety and tradition, there is a utilitarian justification: ‘It is good to be used against the non-Muslims, because they are not afraid of fighting for five days against us but they are afraid of one bomber.’
Thursday, 24, April, 2008 at 10:10 pm |
This is certainly an intersting article! However, perhaps we need look a level deeper with regards the Taliban’s cultural base – or its changing strategic culture. Yes, before 2001, the Taliban did not resort to suicide bombings, but the change in this respect does not necessarily mean cultural change. Afterall, how do we define the Taliban’s culture? Is this cultural support system directed by the Mullahs – here there is enough evidence to suggest otherwise. The Taliban appoint Mullah’s – not the other way around. The cultural base is deeply intwined in the Pakhtunwali – and not Islam. The tribal code of honour must not be confused with any debate on the Caliphate, Sharia or Islam in itself. If there was a change in modus operandi of the Pakhtunwali – then yes, that would be an example of strategic cultural change. Otherwsie – its just a wise move in so far as strategy is concerned. strategic cultural shift refers to the uprooting of deep seated and well entrenched value guidelines on who we are , and how act – in the case of the Taliban- its fairly intact. But what has changed is their strategy. A few humble points on another perspective perhaps!!
Friday, 25, April, 2008 at 7:58 am |
Your definition game is a bit convenient, NC.
Partly my point is that the Taliban are not rigidly tribalists or Islamists, but that culture is an ambiguous set of ideas through which people make strategy.
In this case, suicide bombing was once considered both unmanly and a violation of religious principle, and is now being adopted with new justifications derived from the same heritage of ideas.
This strikes me as a non-trivial adjustment on a pretty major strategic issue.
Furthermore, there is evidence that the Taliban are not primarily a tribal movement united around Pakhtunwali. They have uzbek and tajik clerics, they are recruiting outside Pashtun boundaries, and tribal elders are finding themselves increasingly marginalised.
Moreover, we also need to explain the repeated defections in and out of the Taliban umbrella.
Whichever way you define it, this is a mutable culture.
Monday, 23, June, 2008 at 10:41 pm |
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