AQ as Oddfellows?

 

In the most recent edition of International Security there appears an article in which, after reviewing other research, Max Abrahms posits that

 

Empirical evidence is accumulating in terrorism studies and political psychology that individuals participate in terrorist organizations not to achieve their political platforms, but to develop strong affective ties with fellow terrorists.

 

Looking at research from the broad sweep of terrorist activity, from Europe, the Middle East, and Asia over the past 30 years, he goes on to identify seven ‘puzzles’ which seem to make the notion that terrorism follows a ’strategic model’ problematic.  A great deal of terrorist behaviour tends to be counter-productive, if its aim really is to achieve some specific goal.  For instance, terrorists tend to destroy competing, but equally committed, groups.  One would assume, according to a strategic motivation, that ‘fellow travellers’ would be encouraged, or at least tolerated, insofar that they helped to achieve a common, desired end. 

 

Abrahms believes that, instead, participation in terrorist groups is all about…well, participation.  His arguments to back up this claim are:  

 

1.       Terrorist organizations appeal disproportionately to certain psychological types of people, namely, the socially alienated.

 

2.       Members from a wide variety of terrorist groups…say that they joined these armed struggles not because of their personal attachment to their political or ideological agendas, but to maintain or develop social relations with other terrorist members.

 

3.       Recent studies have found that the key…condition for their joining the terrorist organization was having a friend or relative in it.

 

4.       Case studies concluded that most of the terrorists in these groups participated in the armed struggle to improve their relationships with other terrorists or to reduce their sense of alienation from society, usually both.

 

5.       Many terrorist foot soldiers and even their leaders never develop a basic understanding of their organization’s political purpose.

 

6.       Terrorist organizations focus their recruitment on the socially isolated, not on people with a demonstrable commitment to their given political cause.

 

7.       Terrorist organizations are particularly attractive outlets for those seeking solidarity…Terrorist groups are far more tight-knit than other voluntary associations because of the extreme dangers and costs of participation, as well as their tendency to violate societal expectations.  This observation may account for the fact that even when terrorist organizations fail to achieve their political platforms, committing acts of terrorism tends to generate new recruits, boost membership morale, and otherwise strengthen the social unit.

 

8.       Terrorists seem to prefer participating in terrorist groups and activities most conducive to developing strong affective ties with fellow terrorists.

 

9.       Terrorist organizations collapse when they cease to be perceived as desirable social collectivities worth joining.

 

If this is true, then the idea of terrorists as political zealots is off the mark.  Strangely, then, it is perhaps contemporary fictional accounts of terrorists (such as Updike’s The Terrorist and Le Carre’s Absolute Friends) which provide the best account of what a terrorist might look and think like.  Abrahms is careful to state that there is no single terrorist profile, but his meta-review of a broad body of research does convince. 

 

So what is to be done?  Here Abrahms recommends a change in the way in which we deal with terrorist groups.  The focus tends to swing back to a criminological/law enforcement strategy, rather than a national security one.  Especially in terms of ‘home grown’ terrorists, where ever home might be, this is instructive. 

 

The idea that terrorists (and terrorist wannabees), like vandals, graffiti artists, and gang-bangers ‘have nothing else to do’ appears at once disarming and truly terrifying.  I would think that more basketball courts and better funding for ‘after school care’ are not the answer.  Neither would slapping an ASBO on Osama Bin Laden.  However, the implied causal connection between Timothy McVeigh and the Columbine murders (that connection being radical social isolation), can easily be made to extend to Gaza, Luton, Marseilles, and beyond.  For that matter, it would seem that terrorists ‘join up’ for some of the same reasons that soldiers do: not just for king, country, college, and cash, but also for camaraderie and a sense of belonging to something bigger than themselves.

 

However, can this explain something as large and well coordinated as, say, 9/11 or an insurgency?  I would think that the entire field of terrorism and insurgency studies (if one can be so bold as to aggregate something so multifarious into a coherent field) must be viewed with a critical eye.  Just as a bar fight, a post-hockey game victory riot (don’t get me started on the real opiate of the masses that is professional sports) and a military battle share some characteristics, we must be judicious to avoid overstretching the parallels. 

 

Finally, we should not forget that an organisation such as AQ does an admirable job of tying individual existentialist longing to a collective instrumental strategy.  As Dave Betz’s earlier post on Tankel’s article about Al Qaeda makes clear, the ’senior management’ of AQ is able to pitch a broad tent.  Bring them your tired, your poorly socialised and they will turn them into something greater.