Peter Feaver writes an intriguing exposé on his time within the NSC and his part in crafting the American strategy on Iraq in this month’s issue of Commentary magazine. In it he raises several points worthy of further discussion.
1. One wonders if his views on civil-military relations have changed much, given his taste of being an ‘insider’. The (predominantly although not exclusively) American practice of having academics serve within government appears to have its good and bad points, but any way you slice it, it must be a good for academics to try and practice what they preach. I won’t expand on this.
2. He speaks at length about the difficulty of having a policy or a strategy judged on its own merits. He alludes to a large degree of knee-jerk partisanship/ideology (mostly hostile to the position to where he found himself).
An extension of this point is the power of naming. For instance, he speaks of changing the title of a plan to include the word ”victory”, rather than “support”. Is language that powerful? You bet.
Consider the “surge” as a name. It connotes power, as well as short duration. The same strategy was nearly called the “bridge”, a name that connotes connection or extension. Which one could a country get behind?
Wednesday, 23, April, 2008 at 5:12 am |
[...] Kings of War – Peter Feaver writes an intriguing exposé on his time within the NSC and his part in crafting the American strategy on Iraq in this month’s issue of Commentary magazine. In it he raises several points worthy of further discussion. [...]
Thursday, 24, April, 2008 at 9:20 am |
Feaver was on a panel I chaired on “Academics in Public Service” at the Int Studies Association annual convention last month. Also on the panel were Tom Mahnken (currently heading the think tank in Office of Sec of Defence), Steve Krasner (former head of Policy Planning Burea in State), and Emily Goldman (advisor on strategic communication in DOD and State).
Feaver made a number of fascinating and amusing observations about his time in NSC. What was most striking was that all the speakers agreed that serving in public office (a) does nothing for your academic career and (b) puts enormous strain on family life. Still, one understands the allure of going into govt temporarily to put theory into practice.
Other points well made include: policy ideas are bubbling away in DC waiting for the right conditions to come to fruition; labelling is crucial to policy adoption; unlike in academia, where one has ownership over ideas, in govt, ideas are public property – hence in govt, you WANT your ideas to be plagarised and shld not expect any credit for them.
Thursday, 24, April, 2008 at 12:28 pm |
“Still, one understands the allure of going into govt temporarily to put theory into practice.”
I recall a while back someone arguing that there’s a good PhD waiting to be written looking at the degree to which, when US academics (British academics should be so lucky…) are appointed to positions in the foreign policy/defence bureaucracies, their theoretical work actually does (or doesn’t) inform their practices in office. Strikes me as a pretty valid enterprise.
Might have been Dr Honig, actually.
Thursday, 24, April, 2008 at 8:09 pm |
I like the idea of the Strategy for Victory now coming together beautifully, lol. Like Petreaus stroke of genius wasnt to completely reverse former Bush policy and pay off the Baathists. Like the Awakening councils and Sadr are defeated already, and Maliki isnt just a Iranian stooge whose party fough for Iran against Iraq in the war. Victory! Woohoo!
I also like the Rush Limbaugh dismissal of his political opponents as useless cowards, showing true class and respect. So many of the Bush people read like fratboys. What a pompous piece of s”#t, sorry for the vulgarity.