The British and American militaries have been involved in operations in Afghanistan and Iraq for the past seven years. In this time, units have experienced an uneven balance of kinetic and non-kinetic operations, depending on the village/town/city/province in which they were deployed at a specific point in time. The character of the war has been continually evolving. In 2003-2004 in Fallujah, Ramadi, and Tora Bora, there was heavy kinetic fighting against insurgents armed with RPGs, explosively formed projectiles, and IEDs/VBIEDs. This is the case in Basra and Helmand in 2008.
As the security situation has improved in other areas, the U.K. and U.S. forces have shifted to less kinetic counterinsurgent operations. They have run the gamut of conducting negotiations with local leaders, patrolling village neighbourhoods, searching houses and local buildings, rapport-building through interaction with local children, using information operations and cultural awareness to gain actionable intelligence tips and understand the local societal dynamics, and aiding in the reconstruction of buildings and establishing basic social services such as providing SWET (sewage, water, electricity and trash). These are the cities of Tal Afar, Ramadi, and Dahuk in 2008.
With the U.S. in a highly-anticipated election year and the U.K. has been debating troop withdrawal from the two wars, it is important to look ahead to 2030. Not for the usual arguments of “Where will Iraq and Afghanistan be?” but rather, “Where will the U.K. and U.S. military be?” Not geographically or financially. Rather, how will the experiences of the wars of the early 21st century influence the wars of this current generation?
And why do we care?
The wars of Afghanistan and Iraq have been formative wars for many of our nations’ junior enlisted and officer corps. Depending on their time of deployment and region, they are likely to take away different lessons about the character of warfare. If a private cut his teeth in Helmand, 2008, he may equate current warfare with contemporary warfare – there is an enemy who can pack a punch, and we need to shoot first. The private in Najaf, 2008, might have a different experience entirely. For him, effective operations meant nightly visits to the town’s mayor and local police chief, drinking chai, speaking through an interpreter, watching T.V. with the local jundi and helping rebuild the local school. There’s an enemy somewhere, but he’s not here.
Same age, same military, two different worlds completely.
In 1990-1991, the generals leading the Americans through the Gulf War had their introduction to warfare and their role in it in the quasi-limited, quasi-conventional, quasi-counterinsurgent war in Vietnam. The confused and schizophrenic national strategy combined a coercive air campaign and an attritional land campaign. The situation on the ground was even more jumbled by the micromanagement of the civilian leadership under President Lyndon B. Johnson, who was mistrustful of the generals and the military after observing their behaviour toward his predecessor during the Cuban Missile Crisis. The events that occurred during the war are well known. By the time forces withdrew in 1973, the U.S. military had been broken, and the public was as fond of war as they were of taxes. The lieutenants of the 1970s spent the next twenty years rebuilding and re-establishing their institution for the next, decidedly not limited war.
The Gulf War was the test. After twenty years of preparations and promotions, the former lieutenants, now generals, were in the position to rectify the mistakes of the 70s. They rejected the use of escalation, were careful of civilian micromanagement while obeying their political masters, and were going to use the doctrine of “overwhelming force” to disarm their Iraqi opponents quickly and decisively. Thanks to the political control and awareness of the Bush Sr. administration, coupled with the technical and professional training of the revamped American forces, the war was fought and won in 100 hours. And Bush Sr. declared the “Vietnam syndrome” null and void.
At the end of the day, it was due to their coming-of-age in 1960s/70s Vietnam that the senior civilian and military leaders planned and prepared and were ready for 1990s Gulf War. We don’t know what warfare in the next twenty years will look like. What we do know is our junior military personnel are looking at future warfare in a very different light.
Saturday, 2, February, 2008 at 2:46 am |
Nice post Jaz. Yes indeed, militaries tend to re-fight the last major war especially when that war was formative for the flag grade officers. But your point is a good one: looking at Iraq and AFG, it is difficult to predict how this will shape military perceptions of the future of warfare precisely b/c these campaigns have seen operations that run the spectrum from combined arms conventional warfare to tea-drinking KLE.