I don’t believe in doing things by halves: so when I get it wrong, I get it wrong good and proper. So it is with the Danes. Contrary to my observation – made to an assembly of some 500 senior officers – that the Danes were “pretty useless” in Afghanistan, it transpired that they are among our most reliable allies in that campaign.
Last week I discovered that the Danes sent a tough crew to Bosnia. Indeed, the Danes were the only country to contribute main battle tanks to the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) for Bosnia. Most countries contributed a battalion sized contingent. Britain and France each sent mechanised battalions with infantry fighting vehicles (we sent 46 Warriors) and support helicopters. But the Danes sent a company of Leopard IIs Is. And they weren’t shy about using them.
So when British General Sir Michael Rose took over as UNPROFOR commander for Bosnia in 1994, and wanted to make a show of force, he sent the Danes to relieve the besieged town of Tuzla. As the New York Times reported, when Serb gunners opened fire, the Danish tanks “didn’t hunker down, they shot back, letting loose more than 70 rounds.” The Serbs took on the Danes again, on 29 April, resulting in five Serb T-55 tanks being destroyed by Danish fire.
As the American’s learned in Somalia, every peace force should include some heavy metal, ideally Danish it would seem.
Update (22 Jan pm): Danish tanks in Helmand
Many thanks to Alex for pointing us towards this article in yesterday’s Times, on the coalition hold & build ops in the Upper Gereshk Valley. The story is mostly about how a British-Danish battlegroup evicted – albeit it politely, with regret, and offering generous compensation – an Afghan family from their home so the compound could be turned into a FOB.
The article went on to discuss the battlegroup’s most prized asset:
The Danes have brought 52-tonne Leopard II tanks to the area. Their sighting system is accurate enough to put a shell through the door of a Taleban-held compound with 95 per cent accuracy at a range of 2.5 miles (four kilometres), negating much of the reliance on close air support. Three weeks ago the tanks savaged a strong Taleban ambush, killing two senior commanders and many fighters.
“The Leopards have had exactly the psychological effect that I hoped they would, both on the Taleban and my men,” Colonel Kristensen [the battlegroup CO] added. “The Taleban know that when they start a contact they have between five and ten seconds before it’s over. And far from frightening the locals, the elders in the shuras tell us that tanks are the best tools against the Taleban.”
Tuesday, 22, January, 2008 at 2:18 pm |
This was the incident in which the Danish woman tank commander fired something like 16 main gun rounds at a sniper; asked why, she supposedly answered that “well, I didn’t have any more”.
I see they’ve brought the heavy metal to Afghanistan, too.
Tuesday, 22, January, 2008 at 3:48 pm |
Not that it could make the least amount of difference, but the tanks the Danes deployed to Bosnia were Leopard 1A5’s, they got the Leo 2 in the late 90’s…
The Danes are not the only ones to rediscover the value of heavy armor, the Canadians, who were set to scrap all their MBT’s, and join the Belgians in being one of the first NATO armies to be without them at all, and rely on wheeled Stryker Mobile Gun Systems instead are also turning in their tracks. After their experiences in Afghanistan, they are now borrowing 20 Leo 2 A6s from Germany, and they are out hunting for a substantial number of Leo 2s for future operations, basically reintroducing them to their force structure. It is indeed, what one journal referred to it as, transformation in reverse.
Tuesday, 22, January, 2008 at 7:08 pm |
Many kudos,
for, once more, taking the time to set the record straight, it’s appreciate.
Wednesday, 23, January, 2008 at 3:12 pm |
I’m a War Studies student and new to this blog and I’m giving my first post a go. I believe in the merits of having MBTs in Afghanistan as opposed to relying on CAS from helicopters gunships & aircraft because they can contribute in two ways the latter cannot. First of all, they have the ’staying power’ that is necessary to provide a sense of security that will prevent civilians from siding with the Taleban (who rely on their staying power, in turn). You can park a Leopard on a hilltop for a much longer period and provide local people the feeling of security that they need to win them over to your side. Second, MBTs are a visible deterrent against Taleban and associated fighters. As is indicated in the post, their effectiveness is demonstrated. because they don’t have to ‘fly in’, they have a much greater grip on the actual situation on the ground and can respond much quicker and in a more appropriate, say tailor-made, sense. Having discussed this with the commander of the Dutch 42nd tank brigade, they’re saying they’re ready to move in. The con is ofcourse that employing MBTs in your strategy takes the conflict to a whole new level as it becomes much more an occupying force rather than an expeditionary force, which may not be appreciated politically back home.
Wednesday, 23, January, 2008 at 4:04 pm |
There are other, smaller, issues with the deployment of tanks that do have an effect on peace support and stability operations. We deployed in Kosovo in 1999 with a troop of Leopard Is and they can have their drawbacks. For one thing, they don’t negotiate narrow roads, light bridges, or buried culverts very well. The destruction of small holdings’ fences and other infrastructure is a continual nuisance and a source of discontentment with the locals. Second, it is hard to ’smile and wave’ from a tank. This needs to be balanced with the need for protection and firepower, obviously.
Also it is worth bearing in mind that some countries use overseas missions as a ‘raison d’etre’ upon which to acquire all sorts of military kit, even if it is only remotely needed for the current mission. The Canadians have bought or are buying/leasing C17s, many new C130J, 46 155mm towed artillery, over 100 Leo IIs, and UAVs, as well as other bits and pieces for their infantry. The logic is not just ‘buy for today’ but equally ‘buy it today for tomorrow’, along the lines of ‘make hay while the sun shines’.
Wednesday, 23, January, 2008 at 5:42 pm |
Bill: thanks for your comment. I entirely agree w/ your points about the ’staying power’ and ‘deterrent/assurance effect ‘ of MBTs. Interesting comparison here with AC-130s, which also provide highly acurrate heavy fire from a relatively secure platform but obviously has less presence.
FB: thanks for sharing your experience from Kosovo. They are clumsy beasts, true. And they must indeed create some distance between troops and the locals.
My overall conclusions: (1) ideally you want a balanced force for stability and peace ops. We tend to focus on light infantry patrolling among the people, but we ought not loose sight of the need for some heavy metal to deal with peace spoilers; (2) the composition of the deployed force will be shaped by domestic politics – obviously. Hence, the DOD turned down requests for armour from Adm. Howe and the US deputy force commander in UNOSOM II in August 1993, because they did not want to lend the appearance that the US was escalating its commitment to Somalia; (3) the posture of MBTs in the force ought to be shaped by local attitudes towards international forces. If the locals are ambivalient – as in Somalia in 1993 – then it wd be best to get out and about and park the MBTs somewhere handy. If the locals are well disposed towards the force but are looking to them for security – as in AFG today – then make sure the MBTs are in clear view of friends and foe alike.
Endre: fascinating observation re: Canadians doing transformation in reverse. I wonder if, as FB suggests, it is a clever bureaucratic rouse to get more kit. I know that in the Brit case, we are buying lots of kit under UORs (261 UORs between early 2006 and Feb. 2007) but the senior officers I’ve spoken to make it clear that this merely goes to indicate the REAL gap between current equip capability and operational requirements. In some cases, such as the new IFVs (Mastiff and Bulldog) being rushed to AFG, the urgently ordered kit could possibly threaten new equipment programmes (in this case, FRES) were the military to be stuck with it (tho’ the current deal w/ the Treasury is that the military does not have to keep equipment acquired under UORs).
Lars: thanks – just telling it as I now see it.
In closing, may I say that I would dearly love to lease a Leopard II, so that I could deliever a complaint letter, taped to the end of a 155 round, to the offices of my new (soon to be ex-) internet service provider, TalkTalk. I would expand on this point but am trying my best to think calm, happy thoughts….
Thursday, 24, January, 2008 at 5:55 am |
Theo, Leopard II rounds are 120mm, although some work has been done on the development of a 140mm variant.
Thursday, 24, January, 2008 at 7:02 am |
Argggg! Of course 120mm. I think my brain is going into meltdown these days, under the strain of dealing w/ TalkTalk. So irritating. Bad enough saying that the Danes had Leo 11s in Bosnia when it was Leo 1s, but then to confuse a 120 with 155 (which is the calibre for M109) is even worse. As a self-confessed mil tech geek, I actually know this stuff!!!
*Big sigh*
Anyways, thanks Pedant.
Saturday, 26, January, 2008 at 12:57 pm |
This is only partially related, but interesting nonetheless. There are recent tactical battlefield notes relating to MBTs and ATGMs in:
Hezbollah at War: A Military Assessment by Andrew Exum. http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC04.php?CID=260
Tuesday, 12, February, 2008 at 5:29 am |
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