ARMED FORCES JOURNAL – Bridging the civil-military gap – December 2007
Frank Hoffman is the clearest thinker on contemporary security matters that I know. He has a piece in the latest Armed Forces Journal (linked to above) on US civil-military relations which will I’m sure get a few people lathered up. While Iraq and Vietnam are very different conflicts, there is a chance that their respective aftermaths may conform to similar patterns of scapegoating, blame-avoiding, and wilful institutional refusal to recognize and act on the sources of defeat. Hoffman doesn’t pull any punches:
America’s generals have been checked by a form of war that they did not prepare for and do not understand. They spent the years following the 1991 Persian Gulf War mastering a system of war without thinking deeply about the ever-changing nature of war. They marched into Iraq having assumed, without much reflection, that the wars of the future would look much like the wars of the past.
Instead of railing about generals “in revolt,” we should be gravely concerned with those serving admirals and generals who knew better and were silent. Their adherence to the principle of civilian control is obligatory, but it must be matched by an equal show of moral character. I sincerely hope that tomorrow’s generals realize that respect for the office of those elected and appointed to oversee the military does not override their obligations to express themselves clearly and candidly at all times. If more would speak up while in office, fewer would need to speak out later. An all-too-narrow conception of civilian control and personal loyalty to civilian executives has overridden moral obligations to the American people, the Congress and the military profession.
Don’t stop there. Read the whole thing.
Thursday, 6, December, 2007 at 1:20 pm |
Your right, an outstanding piece sure to ignite the keyboards.
Just to start it off I think he is slightly wrong in one area. Because he is comparing OIF to Vietnam he seems to be focusing on the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the source of the military advice that the political elites should be receiving. In Vietnam, that was generally correct because they did possess warfighting authority. Since the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the JCS possess no warfighting authority and are not involved in the writing of war plans or the conduct of operations. That is the responsibility of the Combatant Commanders, who possess a direct chain of command, from themselves to the National Command Authority (President and Sec Def). The JCS are charged with providing forces to the Combatant Commander and to organize, train and equip the different services.
One aspect that I think he missed was the responsibility of Congress in letting this happen, as the balancing agency in the US form of government. They can request anyone to testify (as witnessed by Gen. Eric Shineski comments on the peacekeeping requirements in Iraq) and hold the purse strings to the budget. While not normally consulted before the fact, they can and do hold hearings after the events and should be able to nudge the administration in a particular direction. One thing we have not seen is Congress standing up to this administration with regards to Iraq in any substantive manner.
Another point is how do we know that the military commanders have not been providing this advice and being told (in effect) ‘Thanks very much, here are your orders…’ There are rules about speaking out in public when you are a serving officer. The ethos I was exposed to said to argue your point until a decision was made, then salute and do your absolute best to carry it out. While I suspect Hoffman is correct in his analysis, the only evidence is the fact that no high-ranking officer has resigned in protest and started writing and/or talking.
A couple of related articles, which expands Hoffman’s analysis in case anyone is interested:
Joseph Hoar “Critical Dilemma: Loyalty versus Honesty”, Naval Institute Proceedings, Jan 2005
Mark Cancian “No Stab in the Back in Iraq”, Naval Institute Proceedings, April 2005
John Riggs and George Worthington “Crossing Swords: The General’s Revolt” Naval Institute Proceedings, June 2006
Monday, 10, December, 2007 at 12:06 am |
“While Iraq and Vietnam are very different conflicts, there is a chance that their respective aftermaths may conform to similar patterns of scapegoating, blame-avoiding, and wilful institutional refusal to recognize and act on the sources of defeat.”
And perhaps more significant, a withdrawal from international deployments that don’t immediately threaten American security. ‘No blood for oil’ will become ‘No blood for, whatever!’ Vietnam gave us the feckless Jimmy Carter. Iraq seems likely to give us Hillary Clinton–hardly feckless, but beholden entirely to the MoveOn.Org isolationist wing of the Democratic party.
Or not? It’s Barack Obama who has made the most forthright case for precipitate US withdrawal from Iraq. But do the math! ‘Troops home within sixteen months!’ The next presidential inauguration will be January 2009. Sixteen months thereafter is May 2010.
– Dan Ford