Of all the services, the British Army has been most affected by the end of the Cold War. The primary mission of the Army shifted from forward defence of NATO by armour heavy divisions based in Germany, to expeditionary operations by mechanised infantry battlegroups in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Already this change was anticipated in the defence review instigated by the incoming Labour government (the 1998 Strategic Defence Review [SDR]) with the creation of the Joint Rapid Reaction Force, to which was assigned the Army’s elite deployable brigades (3 Commando, 24 Airmobile, and ready brigades from 1 and 3 Armoured Divisions). The main effort since SDR has been on “rebalancing” the Army for the post-Cold War world.
The most recent Defence White Paper (2003) establishes the requirement for more capable deployable brigades and lower level battlegroups: especially in terms of logistics and other “force enablers”. It also sets the new 2-3-1 Future Army Structure: that is, two heavy armoured brigades, three medium weight brigades, and a light brigade (an additional light brigade has since been added).
Hence, the British Army’s transformation plans centre on the development of an expeditionary medium weight capability. The focus, for Army chiefs, is on the new ground manoeuvre platform that would deliver this capability: the Future Rapid Effects System (FRES). The FRES programme is innovative in form. Whereas previously the Army has had single platform programmes – such as the Warrior infantry fighting vehicle and the Challenger main battle tank – FRES is 16 variants on one platform. Clustered into three families – utility, reconnaissance, and heavy – these variants shall deliver the full range of medium weight battlefield functions including, protected mobility, light armour, command and control, combat support, and combat engineering.
FRES has undergone considerable changes since the original concept was outlined in 2001. The number of vehicles to be acquired has increased from approximately 1,500 to 3,775, and the vehicle weigh has increased from 17 tonnes to 20-27 tonnes. The weigh increase is significant for it has required abandoning the original requirement for FRES to be transportable by a C-130, which would have given FRES added in-theatre mobility. However, learning lessons from current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army has determined that additional armour is more important that greater transportability. Moreover, in terms of strategic airlift, this requirement shall be met by the acquisition of 25 new A400M, which have a revised in-service date of 2011, as well as the enlarged fleet of six C-17s. FRES was originally supposed to be in-service by 2009. The Army is pushing hard for FRES to be fielded by 2012, but the main contractor is suggesting that 2017 is a more realistic date.
The direction of British Army transformation is consistent with developments in NATO since 2002, especially, the establishment of Allied Command Transformation, the NATO Response Force, and the Prague Capabilities Commitment (which commits the Europeans to improving their expeditionary capability). But the British Army is looking more towards the United States than Europe, as a source of ideas and inspiration for military transformation. The bottom line is that the British expect to be doing major expeditionary operations with the United States, if not under US leadership, and so the imperative is to be in step with the Americans on such matters. The recent experience in Afghanistan, with lacklustre performance by the big European states, reinforces this view.
This imperative is evident in the ties between the FRES programme and its equivalent in the United States, the Future Combat Systems (FCS) programme. In 2003, the head of equipment capability in the MOD, Lt. Gen. Robert Fulton, reported to the House of Commons Defence Committee on the “very, very close links that we have with the American [FCS] programme.” The FRES programme team appear to be primarily using FCS to provide peer to peer benchmarking for FRES. Thus, some of the key programme requirements for FRES were “walked across” from FCS, such as, the (now abandoned) C-130 transportability requirement for FRES. At the same time, British officers recognise clear differences between FRES and FCS. FCS is a far, far more ambitious programme. Where FRES is an extended family of network enabled platforms, FCS is a fully networked system of systems. Network enablement of FRES is to be provided by simply plugging in the new Bowman tactical radio system.
By comparison, a bespoke network is being developed for FCS that is, quite simply, the “most complex” in the history of US defence acquisition. This involves developing 63 million lines of software (3 times more than being developed for Joint Strike Fighter) that will control 95% of FCS functionality. Many of the other key technologies in FCS – such as the electric drive system and active protection system – are also revolutionary and far in advance of anything likely to be integrated in FRES.
These new technologies, especially the network, are intended to make FCS equipped battalions the “most lethal” yet fielded by the U.S. Army, and certainly as combat capable as a current heavy battalions equipment with Abrams and Bradleys. In contrast, FRES is not meant to have the combat power of current heavy brigades equipped with Challengers and Warriors. In this sense, the British Army is consciously sacrificing combat power for increased mobility.
This disparity in technological development is partly down to a gross disparity in programme resources. The FCS programme will produce 15 medium weight battalions against 9 battalions for FRES. But whereas FRES is projected to cost £14.5 billion pounds, FCS is projected to cost somewhere between $160-230 billion. But, it also reflects a general British scepticism towards expecting too much from brand new technologies.
With FRES we have a pretty good idea of what we are getting. When it finally arrives, FRES may not be cutting edge but it does promise a key medium weight capability that the British Army desperately needs. FCS promises to blow the socks off anything else on the battlefield, but god only knows if it will actually work!
Friday, 23, November, 2007 at 9:34 am |
[...] billion), and we are paying for 232 new Eurofighters (£19 billion), and the Army shall be getting FRES (around £14 billion). Real growth has been built into the defence budget of 1.4% between now and [...]
Thursday, 4, December, 2008 at 5:50 pm |
Interesting stuff. As you point out, “FRES was originally supposed to be in-service by 2009…the main contractor is suggesting that 2017 is a more realistic date.”
I think a large degree of the responsibility for this lies with the MoD’s general approach to procurement, and its naive belief in the value of Systems Engineering methodology. The MoD routinely farms work out to Systems Houses when it doesn’t want to make a decision itself; it’s a form of institutionalised procrastination.
Friday, 5, December, 2008 at 10:55 am |
I wish we’d just accept that we arent very good at procurement. Commercial off the shelf is clearly the way to go, in return for the right to manufacture spares, so that we can keep some basic arms industry capacity alive. Can’t we just buy our armoured vehicles from the Germans, our helicopters from the Americans, our ships from the Scandinavians and our jets from the Saudis once they get bored of their new toys (or perhaps the Australians, once they’ve bankrupted themselves on the F-35). These people are our Allies. They are led by the stablest governments around. Enough with the ‘what if they start a war’ arguments.