Folly to attack Iran?
The folly of war with Iran | csmonitor.com
Not that I’ve done any scientific survey of opinion on the matter but it seems to me that by and large most analysts and pundits are broadly in accord with the argument in the article linked to above: attacking Iran would be a bad idea. That, more or less, is the view I hear from colleagues here in the Department of War Studies. We’ll just have to learn to live with a nuclear Iran–as we have a nuclear China, India, Pakistan, and now North Korea. (Note, nobody seriously doubts that Iran is working towards a nuclear capability).
I beg to differ. I think Hillary Clinton is right to strike a hawkish note on Iran. While I see no reason to attack this instant a certain amount of credible saber-rattling now may make saber-wielding later less necessary; but ultimately, if Iran cannot be encouraged to desist by diplomatic and other means, then other other means must be employed: force. The CSM article makes a strong argument against it which, for me, is ultimately unconvincing:
In 2001, the US launched a justifiable war against Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan. Two years later, the Bush administration launched a far more dubious war in Iraq. Neither conflict has ended in victory. Both are ongoing. With those two wars on the front burner, why is anyone considering three wars at a time?
There is ample justification for concern about the second and third order effects of an attack on Iran on operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. But let’s not forget the first order effects of a nuclear-armed Iran on the region and the globe which are, in my view, even less pleasant to contemplate. Rock. Hard place. Pick one.
Bombing Iran now seems no more likely to produce positive results in Southwest Asia than the Nixon-Kissinger massive bombing of Hanoi produced an American victory in Vietnam.
A red herring. The aim of bombing Iran would be to set back their nuclear programme not to solve our problems in Iraq and Afghanistan. If Iran were attacked it would not be cooperative elsewhere. The theatres are linked. Let’s be clear-eyed about that. The question is what is the value of their cooperation now? And, assuming Iran did achieve nuclear capability why would that make them more tractable in future? It seems to me logically they would be less.
While it seems clear that an American war with Iran might be in Israel’s interest, it is not necessarily so. Some in Saudi Arabia might like to see rival Iran pummeled by the US military. But the US should not fight proxy wars for Saudi Arabia or Israel, and it’s debatable if either would ultimately be safer in the long run after a US attack on Iran.
I agree. The US should not be anyone’s proxy. The US should lead the appropriate international response to Iran’s violation of its legal treaty obligations which is to use force if diplomacy will not work. I don’t know about Saudi Arabia but there has been a debate about this in Israel which is fairly strongly of the mind that their security and Iran as a nuclear power are incompatible. I think this is a well-founded concern and they are justified in their apprehension. Faced with the choice between attack and what they feel is a credible threat of national annihilation Israel will choose the latter. In this it will be seen, quite reasonably, as an American proxy and blame and consequences will follow accordingly. That being the case, why have the Israelis do badly what we could do better with our own hands?
Historically, Iranians see themselves as one of two great Asian military powers, the other being China. Launching a few cruise missiles or bombing uranium-enrichment plants will probably only fuel Iran’s historic ambition to become a regional superpower. An Iranian I spoke with in Tehran five years ago unabashedly admired the US. But he strongly affirmed his country’s right to acquire nuclear weapons as a matter of national pride. After all, he said, “The Pakistanis and the Israelis have them.” …President Bush should begin with the premise that war with Iran is not an option and the realization that constructive engagement may well be the labor of decades. That may not prevent Iran from building a bomb. But states that join the nuclear club, India, Pakistan, and China, have historically tended to behave more, not less responsibly, and treaties between adversarial states have worked.
So here’s the heart of it: 1. President Bush should take war off the table, and 2. Iran will behave responsibly as a nuclear power. To which I would say 1. take war off the table and the prospect of a diplomatic solution diminishes to zero, and 2. how do you know? The truth is there are many good questions about how Iran’s leadership perceives the utility of nuclear weapons, as was discussed in Noah Feldman’s NY Times piece Islam, Terror and the Second Nuclear Age a year ago. The idea that Iran will be a responsible nuclear power should be labeled for what it is: a hope. There is a reason plans are made on the basis of the worst-case scenario and not a wing and a prayer.
One sad consequence of bombing might well be a rallying of the Iranian people around their flagging leadership, boosting popular support for an unpopular regime. You can almost hear Iran’s neoconservative leadership saying, “Make my day.”
Of all the arguments against an attack I think this is the most compelling. The effect on the mood of average Iranians who of all people in the Middle East are reported to be the most Western-leaning and have the least implausible chance of achieving on their own something approximating a stable democratic order is the most tragic. But there are two clocks ticking here: one for the nuclear programme and another for Iran’s own internal political development. Which one is ticking faster? I would bet on the bomb’s clock. But any action on our part to slow it will also slow the other. Perhaps it will not stop it altogether. One can hope.
There it is. Folly to attack Iran? I don’t think so. Yes, dangerous and consequential but all the roads that lead from here are.
Tuesday, 16, October, 2007 at 1:13 pm
Feldman’s piece is profoundly unhelpful with regards to an Iranian nuclear weapon, as he does not engage at all with the Iranian political or military structure that would govern the use of a nuclear weapon. He does not mention the Council of Guardians or the Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamanei, but instead trots out Ahmedinejad who has no control over any security or military organization and will likely not be in office by the time any Iranian nuclear weapon becomes ready.
Time and again the Iranians have played rough and pressed hard, but they have always chosen practicality over apocalyptic martyrdom. This can be seen in their behavior in the ending of the Iran-Iraq War, when the Ayatollah Khomeini himself signed off on a humiliating ceasefire to avoid regime collapse, in their offer to meet the U.S. in the wake of the success of OIF I, and in their assistance with collapsing the Taliban.
How do you know that Iran will not negotiate absent the threat of war? Threatening war is actually a quite poor way to achieve rational negotiations with anyone — in non-diplomatic speak this is called bullying, and it generally only works on those who perceive themselves as much weaker than you. This is certainly not the case with Iran vis a vis the U.S. in the region.
Your argument is very unconvincing. Essentially you offer Iran the choice between humiliation and war. Nations rarely respond positively to such a choice. This based on your evidence-free assertion that Iran cannot be deterred as Maoist China, North Korea, the Stalinist Soviet Union, India, and Pakistan have. I hope you have more on your side than that Feldman article.
Tuesday, 16, October, 2007 at 2:33 pm
I agree with the above comment. You seem to immediately jump to the assumption that Iran, if/when it has nuclear weapons, will definitely act in a less responsible manner than Pakistan, India, or Israel - all members of the “what NPT” club. Given Iran’s history of fending off attacks from Iraq and threats of violence from Israel and the US govt, why wouldn’t they want a nuclear weapon? Indeed, an Indian military leader was quoted in 1991 as saying “the lesson of Gulf War I was that you don’t face down the US govt without a nuclear weapon.” The lesson has been taught twice now.
Retired General John Abizaid has been quoted as saying that we could live with a nuclear-armed Iran. Certainly there are decades of studies and theory on how to manage deterrence between two armed nations. Why is this case different? Can you not recognize political rhetoric of Iran’s leadership as opposed to what their actual intent and direction is? I can guess that if you studied the current administration’s rhetoric and intent/actions, you could be so confused.
Tuesday, 16, October, 2007 at 2:52 pm
I have not asserted that Iran cannot be deterred. I have pointed out that there is reason to question whether they can be. That it is questionable is a source of concern. Why are you so confident of it? What makes you so certain that Iran’s leaders will embrace the principle of moderation?
As I said I see no reason for an attack this instant because perhaps Iran can still be convinced that acquiring a nuclear-weapons capability just isn’t worth it.
Anyway, there is nothing new about force as an element of diplomacy. Intimidation of one kind or another has ever been employed to get other’s to comply with one’s wishes. International affairs is no different. You call it bullying. Better to call it ‘carrot and stick’. Or coercive diplomacy. There is a danger in it, as you suggest. Militarily powerful states may be seduced into thinking they can, with little risk to themselves, intimidate others into doing what they want. But weaker powers can have strong motivations to do what they are doing and call the stronger power’s bluff. This is all the more likely if the stronger power dithers about whether or not force should be on the table in the first place. Hence, Clinton is right to leave it there.
And why exactly is this a choice between humiliation and war? Why should it be framed that way and not as a choice between Iran holding to its treaty obligations and enjoying the positive economic and other benefits thereof and not holding to its treaty obligations which has other consequences economic and military?
Tuesday, 16, October, 2007 at 3:32 pm
“I have not asserted that Iran cannot be deterred. I have pointed out that there is reason to question whether they can be. That it is questionable is a source of concern. Why are you so confident of it? What makes you so certain that Iran’s leaders will embrace the principle of moderation?”
There is no certainty in international affairs. However your reasons for positing that Iran is less likely to be deterred are not convincing and appear to center mostly on … what, exactly? Shi’i eschatology? Ahmadinejad’s latest speech? Feldman’s musings about suicide terrorism? My reasons for why Iran can be deterred are based on Iranian political and military behavior when under conditions which the regime views as regime-threatening - after Iraq retook al-Faw and the Majnoon islands in 1988, in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, and after the U.S. conquered Iraq in three weeks.
“And why exactly is this a choice between humiliation and war? Why should it be framed that way and not as a choice between Iran holding to its treaty obligations and enjoying the positive economic and other benefits thereof and not holding to its treaty obligations which has other consequences economic and military?”
Iran views nuclear power as worth sacrificing for. This is popular in Iran amongst all political factions. Simply telling them that they must stop or face war amounts to the choice I outlined. The Bush Administration used this tactic with North Korea for years and look what it got them. Why should Iran bargain for less than what NK got? A much better idea would be a grand-bargain negotiation for recognition, relations, and the end of sanctions in return for nuclear inspections and an end to arming groups in Iraq. Unfortunately such a negotiation is likely out of reach for the Bush Administration, but perhaps not for a Democratic president.
Tuesday, 16, October, 2007 at 7:50 pm
Important and interesting debate fellas. My own view on this hasn’t change since I posted on my blog last year: “Bomb Iran and then say sorry.” The title does rather give my argument away.
I think we are all agreed that Iran is going hell for leather to build a nuclear weapon. So what to do about it?
Diplomacy - well been doing that for some time now, and it’s not really working b/c, guess what, they WANT the bomb. No amount of yapping is going to change that. So,
* option A. Live w/ a nuclear Iran
* option B. Bomb the facilities
Why select A when we have B? Just don’t get it. Iran may be a perfectly stable reasonable sort of nuclear power. But I wdn’t bet on it, and besides why take the chance? And that’s the point. We tend to focus on the risks of action: risks of destabilising the region, risks of escalation in Iraq, risks of radicalising Iran. Well policymakers as often worry about the risks of inaction. And in this case, rightly so. What cd be more destabilising that a nuclear Iran? I think Iran is already trying to exert as much influence in Iraq as it can. And it’s already pretty radical - if by radical one means anti Western theocracy with a rotten human rights record.
And if the West does not use force to halt the Iranian nuclear programme. Does anyone seriously expect Israel to sit by and do nothing? And Israeli bombing of Iran is likely to be less militarily effective and more politically destabilising than US bombing.
Sure Iranian public opinion will be put out when we bomb them. That’s why we shld say sorry afterwards.
Tuesday, 16, October, 2007 at 8:55 pm
Why should I base my apprehensions on Shi’i eschatology about which I am insufficiently knowledgeable to render judgement–are you?–when I can consult the ‘horse’s mouth’ as it were, genuine experts on the matter, and I don’t mean Feldman. Here’s what one said:
‘I am decisively announcing to the whole world that if the world-devourers [the infidel powers] wish to stand against our religion, we will stand against the whole world and will not cease until the annihilation of all of them. Either we all become free, or we will go to the greater freedom, which is martyrdom. Either we shake one another’s hands in joy at the victory of Islam in the world, or all of us will turn to eternal life and martyrdom. In both cases, victory and success are ours.’
And here’s another:
‘If a day comes when the world of Islam is duly equipped with the arms Israel has in possession, the strategy of colonialism would face a stalemate because application of an atomic bomb would not leave any thing in Israel but the same thing would just produce damages in the Muslim world.’
I’m sure you are quite aware of who spoke these words, just as I am aware that Iranian strategic behaviour has sometimes reflected an appreciation of Realpolitik over theological niceties (eg., it quietly backed Christian Armenia in its war with Shi’ite Azerbaijan). So when it comes to judging Iran’s deterrability I put on one side of the ledger, inter alia, the quotes above and on the other side some things which suggest a measure of rationality and normal strategic calculation. You may suggest–do you?–that we have here an extreme case of actions speaking louder than words (though frankly neither do their actions on the whole give me great confidence). In which case would you please explain the specific calculus you’ve applied to reach the result that Iran is definitely deterrable, whether that includes the quotes above, and if so by what mechanism you exclude from your analysis what the players in question have actually said. Because when I throw it into the mix I come up with a question mark. Which is the point.
You have both said that I have been definite on the point when in fact what I have said is that it is not definite. And that being the case we should assume the worst case and therefore Iran shoud not be trusted with nuclear capability, especially when there are ways to prevent it.
J asks what NPT club Pakistan, Israel and India belong to. The answer in the case of Pakistan is the same one to which Iran does–the one that says you can have access to nuclear technology if you forego weaponization. India and Israel did not sign up to the same agreement in breach of which Iran and Pakistan are. It is not inconsequential to add that whereas India’s and Israel’s nuclear arsenals seriously concern no one but respectively Pakistan and Iran against whom in the case of the latter no existential threat has been voiced (vice versa, the same cannot be said).
Why? Because, well, Pakistan, or in the more benign interpretation, a single, albeit key, Pakistani individual, A.Q. Khan, has been an active proliferator, and because of the well-reasoned and justifiable fear of what should happen if that country should come to be ruled by religious extremists. The difference with Iran is that you needn’t concern yourself with the ‘if’ because the extremists are already in charge.
Tuesday, 16, October, 2007 at 11:53 pm
Theofarrell - I have to say that your middle-way recommendation strikes me as the least practical way to go. Bombs away on the known facilities, but then apologize for doing so?
You ask - why not bomb the facilities? Because the certain consequences outweigh the uncertain risks.
There is no certainty as to where Iran’s nuclear facilities are, the extent to which they are protected or hidden, or even their technical sophistication. A BDA worth a damn would be nearly impossible to achieve given that we have no real baseline for where Iran’s program is now. Certainly we could set it back, but how far? For how long? Do we keep coming back to hit them again and again? In the end you will end up in yet another leaky containment regime, facing the prospect of hitting yet again in another 5 to 10 years, because Iran’s know-how is not going away and certainly its determination will not either.
Moreover, Iran will not sit by idly and be hit. They will react to an act of war with war. Their reaction will cause American casualties in the open, not just from deniable Iraqi hands. The consequences are impossible to gauge, but do not believe that it will end with one strike package. And apologize afterwards, in the hope that the Iranian population will forgive and forget? Are you being purposely naive? Why do you think the Iranians would be any more forgiving than an American population freshly bombed?
“And if the West does not use force to halt the Iranian nuclear programme. Does anyone seriously expect Israel to sit by and do nothing? And Israeli bombing of Iran is likely to be less militarily effective and more politically destabilising than US bombing.”
The Israelis would require American assistance to even reach Iran. If the Americans denied them deconfliction and overflight over Iraqi airspace they would not be able to strike. If the Americans grant them overflight, it might as well act itself. The Israelis will not act independently of the United States.
“And it’s already pretty radical - if by radical one means anti Western theocracy with a rotten human rights record.”
Do not think that the Iranian regime is the worst you can get. Iran today frankly has more freedom than most U.S. allies in the region, and their population is overwhelmingly more pro-Western than any other in the region excepting the KRG. If you wish to invert these, then by all means bombs away.
Betz - So you admit to essentially taking words over deeds. Well, at least you are good enough to cop to it. Some previous words you might mull over:
“My vas pokhoronim!” - “We will bury you” / “We will kill you and bury you” / “You will die and we will be at the funeral.”
““There’s no reason to be concerned about a World War. The most that can happen is that people die […] Half the population is exterminated - that has happened not a few times before in China’s history.”
“In which case would you please explain the specific calculus you’ve applied to reach the result that Iran is definitely deterrable, whether that includes the quotes above, and if so by what mechanism you exclude from your analysis what the players in question have actually said. Because when I throw it into the mix I come up with a question mark. Which is the point.”
The first quote is from Khomeini, who as I noted when facing the collapse of Iran’s armed forces in 1988 did what he swore he would never do and appealed to the UN for a ceasefire with Saddam Hussein. He is also dead and presumably has little direct influence over policy. The second is from Rafsanjani, a man who defines the term nomenklatura and the quote itself is hardly a threat to drop a bomb on Israel - merely a statement that a nuclear Iran would break Israel’s monopoly on nukes in the Middle East, not a first-strike threat.
I tend to weigh words as meaning little compared to deeds done in regime survival situations. You apparently want to weigh words quite heavily next to deeds - enough, apparently, to make airstrikes and concomitant escalation worth it. I am interested as to why political rhetoric makes you believe the Iranian regime is suicidal when their past actions indicate that they are quite the opposite.
“And that being the case we should assume the worst case and therefore Iran shoud not be trusted with nuclear capability, especially when there are ways to prevent it.”
Ways, specifically bombing, that guarantee a vast amount of death and destruction, not limited to the Iranian population, but which hold no such assurance about actually ending Iran’s nuclear quest.
Wednesday, 17, October, 2007 at 8:27 am
There is one more player to reckon with
The Times, October 17, 2007
Vladimir Putin pledges to complete Iranian nuclear reactor
Tony Halpin in Moscow
President Putin forged an alliance with Iran yesterday against any military action by the West and pledged to complete the controversial Iranian nuclear power plant at Bushehr.
A summit of Caspian Sea nations in Tehran agreed to bar foreign states from using their territory for military strikes against a member country. Mr Putin, the first Kremlin leader to visit Iran since the Second World War, insisted that the use of force was unacceptable.
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middle_east/article2673546.ece
Wednesday, 17, October, 2007 at 8:44 am
Hey Tequila, I appreciate your determination to argue your case but I think you are plain wrong on facts and interpretation.
* On the direction of Iranian politics: it’s getting worse not better, see:
Ray Takeyh, “Iran: From Reform to Revolution,” Survival, Vol. 46 (2004). Since this paper was published the Iranians have started waging an undeclared war against the coalition in Iraq.
* On Israel’s ability to launch strikes against the Iranian nuclear facilities, see: Whitney Raas and Austin Long, “Osirak Redux? Assessing Israeli Capabilities to Destroy Iranian Nuclear Facilities,” Int Security, Vol. 31 (2007). Article concludes that the IDF can easily bomb targets in Iran, the trickey thing is getting reliable intell on what to target.
I will agree w/ you on the fact that it is difficult to locate all of Iran’s nuclear facilities. And they will doubtless be in hardened and deeply buried sites. But that does not mean that Israel will not try to pursue a military option if the West stands by and does nothing about Iran’s nuc prog - you bet Israel will strike, and I wdn’t blame them at all for doing so.
Wednesday, 17, October, 2007 at 8:51 am
Good point Olaf. So what does this tell you about the degree of Russia support for coercive diplomacy to push Iran to halt it’s nuclear prog? My reading of this is that Putin is prepared to accept a nuclear armed Iran - which, after all, makes sense in terms of Russia’s desire to counterbalance US power. Without Russian backing, the diplomatic route will fail unless it is backed up by the credible threat of unilateral use of force. And for the threat to be credible, we must be prepared to use force if diplomacy fails.
Shld we be worried about Russia’s position on this? Not at all. We shld be worried about our growing dependency on Russia energy supplies, and we shld take action to reduce this dependency. Russia is no friend to the West. It has terrible human rights record (shld have been kicked out of the Council of Europe ages ago) and a corrupt legal and political system. Scattering radiological material around London really was the final straw.
Putin is cosying up to Iran. Grand, where at least we know for sure where he stands. On the wrong side.
Wednesday, 17, October, 2007 at 10:29 am
Hi Theo,
It will be unsurprising to note that I think you are wrong as well.
On the direction of Iranian politics - absolutely the regime is cracking down and becoming more authoritarian in the face of domestic and economic challenges. Does this mean it is becoming less amenable to a nuclear deterrent - that is, more suicidal? I don’t think Takeyh thinks so given his own opinion on the best prospects for preventing a nuclear Iran. Indeed, his assessment largely parallels my own:
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20070301faessay86202/ray-takeyh/time-for-detente-with-iran.html
The key here is deterrence. Is the Iranian regime willing to sacrifice itself and the Iranian people to use a nuclear weapon against the West or Israel? I would argue that all indications are, from past and current regime behavior, point to NO. I have not seen a decent argument involving anything other than political rhetoric to indicate otherwise.
W/regards to the IAF’s capability to bomb Iran - the IS article has some faults and does not disprove my argument, which is mainly that an IAF strike is largely impossible without American support. The possible routes entail flights and midair refueling over countries that will not grant overflight. Both Turkey and the KSA will not grant overflight and the risks of engaging or at least interference in the form of an attempted intercept to turn back the strike are far too high in both cases. The IAF will not even attempt an Iraq overflight in the face of American opposition.
For those who wish to view it:
http://www.belfercenter.org/files/is3104_pp007-033_raas_long.pdf
Moreover, as Theo himself notes, the overwhelming problem is one of intelligence. The IAF could not find al-Manar’s transmitter during the Lebanon War despite far better intelligence and no operational impediments. Iran is far more difficult in both intel and operational areas. The Israelis may try, but I doubt they are that stupid despite Bibi-generated rhetoric. They know that their chances without an American nod are very low.
Wednesday, 17, October, 2007 at 10:46 am
Theo, I agree with you reg Russia. However, Putin can make life harder if eg one needs local allies in the Caspian area. Russia could compromise the credibility of US’ coercive diplomacy. Alexander L. George advice ‘not to engage in coercive diplomacy unless [one] is prepared to step up military action’ should be kept in mind. (in: The use of force after the CW, p 81)
1981 was a good example of how to close down a nuclear facility without earning too much viable critique (even getting tacit applause) from abroad, and it appears Israelis have just repeated a successful attack again on 6th September, this time against Syria, which makes them the uncontested specialists in this business. But they cannot be successful on their own. The ticking clock is probably even too fast for the Arrow II project, or its successor, to find another way out of this dilemma.
Bombing Iranian nuclear facilities regrettably means bombing Iran. Bombing nuclear plants is fine, bombing a sovereign country of the size of Persia, even if this country is about to organize another Holocaust, is more difficult both technically and politically.
Habitually, a successful operation has few critics. However, is it clear how many targets there have to be hit, how many of them are hardened places, or even underground? I once read the number of 70 suspicious facilities in Iran, which I remembered when today I read the following sentence in Cohen’s “The mystique of air power” about the 1991 campaign against Iraq: ‘It is depressing to recall that the United States began the war with two known Iraqi nuclear facilities on its target list, that it added six during the conflict and that another dozen were uncovered by U.N. inspections only after the war’. One needs a very precise list of targets to do a bombing operation against Iranian nuclear facilities. If such an attack is not 100% successful, it will probably boomerang, and make Iran the leader of all anti Western players.
I would prefer to play for time, hoping that the Iranian economy goes bankrupt, and Ahmadinedschad will be kicked out of office. It would also give hope if tequila is right about the restrictions to A’s political power. If however, it becomes clear that the nuclear clock is ticking faster, one would have to chose the smaller risk, and bomb. Another problem to me is how to justify such an attack: imagine Condy Rice at the Security Council presenting evidence of Iranian WMD.
Wednesday, 17, October, 2007 at 11:38 am
Hi Tequila - I guess we cd go round and round this for ages. Let’s just say that I think the IDF are capable of launching an airstrike against Iranian facilities (overflight rights? do you really think the IDF gives two hoots about such things). Done it once. Can do it again. On Israeli determination to prevent Iran from acquiring nukes, and on Israeli willingess to use force (regardless of what the Americans, or anybody else, says), I think your view on this is, to put it politely, misguided. I mean: Israel does have a pretty clear track record on these matters.
You are right to note that Takeyh prefers to wait it out. He also argued this in a more recent Survival article. But that just means that he has drawn a different set of conclusions. My concern is not with immediate deterrence. Rather it is with the long-term balance of power in the region, and our ability to project influence into it, when Iran acquires a sizeable nuclear capability. Not one warhead, which on current projections it is likely to have in 2009-2010. But say a dozen by 2020. What then? And if Iran acquires nukes, how will the Arab states respond?
Olaf - I agree, the politics of this are complicated by the disaster that is the Iraq War. But nobody is disputing the existence of Iran’s nuclear programme. In this case, irony of ironies, we have clear evidence of Iranian WMD but are not prepared to take forceful action to stop Iran in its tracks.
Wednesday, 17, October, 2007 at 2:01 pm
“Let’s just say that I think the IDF are capable of launching an airstrike against Iranian facilities (overflight rights? do you really think the IDF gives two hoots about such things).”
When it affects operations, yes. For a long-range aerial operation, this sort of thing matters.
“Done it once. Can do it again.”
Iran is not Iraq. It’s much further, the program is better protected, the Iranians are more competent.
COL Rick Francona has good experience in the region - his strictly military analysis is here.
http://francona.blogspot.com/2006/03/iran-israels-air-strike-options.html
“My concern is not with immediate deterrence. Rather it is with the long-term balance of power in the region, and our ability to project influence into it, when Iran acquires a sizeable nuclear capability. Not one warhead, which on current projections it is likely to have in 2009-2010. But say a dozen by 2020. What then? And if Iran acquires nukes, how will the Arab states respond?”
So your solution to a possible constraint on American options and influence in 2020 (that is assuming Tehran can both acquire and produce a weapon on schedule and runs into no technical or economic problems) is to create a massive, extremely violent constraint on American options and influence right now?
As far as unlikely gambles go, I’d prefer to try the Takeyh one first — if it fails, it will likely not cause hundreds if not thousands of deaths, not to mention increasing the likely failure of Iraq by a large degree.
Thursday, 18, October, 2007 at 2:34 am
The Iranians do not (currently) have a nuclear weapon
Bombing Iran WILL result in bad things happening. Probability: 1
NOT bombing Iran (allowing them to attempt to develop a nuclear weapon) MIGHT result in bad things happening: Probability: unknown
If the Iranian regime has even the faintest grip on sanity it will not use a nuclear weapon. Neither will it allow a proxy to use one - because Iran would be immediately destroyed.
There is no evidence that the Iranian leaders are insane and hence no evidence that they cannot be deterred.
THEREFORE: bombing Iran is not the correct choice of action
Thursday, 18, October, 2007 at 11:07 am
Dashing off for a flight soon, so just some quick reactions.
Tequilla: first off, thanks for engaging in a vigorous debate on this issue on KOW. It is appreciated. I also think it important that this issue is now debated precisely b/c European diplomacy is getting nowhere with the Iranians. Even if the path of force is ultimately not taken, it is a good thing for the Iranians to realise that all options are now on the table.
As for our debate re: Israel, I think that it is now occurring on two levels - strategic and operational - and between these levels the balance of will and capability comes into play.
At the strategic level is a question of will: does Israel have the will to use force to stop the Iranians if the world won’t. For if they have the will, then a way can be found. It seems to me that military self-confidence is a core feature of Israeli strategic culture, born out of the experience of 1948 at the foundation of the modern state of Israel and reinforced by the experiences of 1956 and 1973. Now it is true that Lebanon has been a military disaster for Israel since 1982, but strategic cultures are remarkably resilient things and so it cannot be assumed that the Lebanon has dented Israeli military self-confidence. In short, I think it wd be a gross error to under-estimate the strategic will of Israel to use force to protect what it considers to be vital nat security interests.
The question of whether the IAF can successfully launch airstrikes against Iranian nuclear facilities is an operational one. You’ve pointed us to Francona’s blog which discusses the problems. Against this is the Raas and Long article in Int Security (2007) which concludes:
“The foregoing assessment is far from definitive in its evaluation of Israel’s military capability to destroy Iranian nuclear facilities. It does seem to indicate, however, that the IAF, after years of modernization, now possess the capability to destroy even well-hardened targets in Iran with some degree of confidence. Leaving open the question of whether an attack is worth the resulting diplomatic consequences and Iranian response, it appears that the Israelis have three possible routes for an air strike against three of the critical nodes of the Iranian nuclear program. Although these routes present political and operational difficulties, this article argues that the IAF could nevertheless attempt to use them.”
In sum, I think there is sufficient strategic will and operational capability on the part of the Israelis to make it likely as not that they would use force to stop Iran getting the bomb.
Matt: not wanting to get all Rumsfeldian (god forbid), but concerning knowns and unknowns: it is true that we can predict certain terrible consequences that wd follow airstrikes against Iranian nuclear facilities (not in the least, collateral damage). And of course there are other as yet unknown consequences that cd also be terrible. But just because we cannot predict with any certainty the consequences of a nuclear armed Iran, that is not to say that there won’t be terrible consequences. In short: we need to balance predictive assurance with undersirability of consequences in deciding our course of action. Geez…I think I did come over all Rumsfeldian after all…
Thursday, 18, October, 2007 at 1:08 pm
Theo - Regarding Israel - I agree with you on will and to a lesser degree on capability. Where I clash is on Israeli will and capability in the face of American opposition to a strike - I do not see either, especially the latter, being capable enough to disregard a United States that firmly told Israel not to go.
Thursday, 18, October, 2007 at 3:52 pm
I have just come across a review by Peter Galbraith in New York Review of Books which is relevant to this discussion.
Says Galbraith:
… the test of a US–Iran negotiation is not how it measures up against an ideal arrangement but how it measures up against the alternatives of bombing or doing nothing.
I am for negotiation, as I have said, because it may be possible that Iran can be convinced that the nuclear option is just not worth it. If there is a way to allow Iran to back away from its nuclear weapons programme without losing face I am for it. You must accept, however, that may not be possible and if negotiation fails then we are back to the question ‘to bomb or not to bomb?’. How, I’d answer that question is already clear. Moreover, the likelihood of negotiation failing increases when you take the military option off the table. Galbraith says as much:
As long as the Iranians believe the United States has no military option, they have limited incentives to reach an agreement, especially with the Europeans.
To be fair to Galbraith, and you, it would seem to me that were he engaged in this discussion he’d be more in line with the position you have taken. Which is fine because I accept the thrust of what he says. To paraphrase: Bush administration has made a fucking mess of the situation. It’s just at the end of the day the least bad fix may be to attack. You said above,
In the end you will end up in yet another leaky containment regime, facing the prospect of hitting yet again in another 5 to 10 years, because Iran’s know-how is not going away and certainly its determination will not either.
To which I say: result! 5-10 and a repeat is better than nothing. So Hillary Clinton is right to keep the option in her handbag which was the thrust of the Times article I linked to originally.
Incidentally, the only thing I ‘copped’ to was a belief that analysis should take account of all the evidence and that what people say about a thing matters in any calculation of what they think about a thing. Thank you for the quotes which I have mulled over, not for the first time. I don’t think that because Khrushchev and Mao said crazy things and then turned out not to be so should inure you to the possibility that Iran’s leaders might actually mean what they say. How do you not see Rafsanjani’s quote as speaking quite directly to the question of deterrence, the central plank of which is mutual assured destruction?
Finally, you chucked in a comparison to North Korea which is not at all as straightforward as you suggest. Sadly, there is no choice with North Korea other than to tolerate their nuclear status and to deter it in the Cold War manner. This is because 1. NK already does possess nuclear arms and 2. because even before that it had an effective deterrent in the form of thousands of entrenched artillery within range of Seoul (and capable of firing chemical shells) that could have killed hundreds of thousands of Koreans and decimated the major industrial, scientific and cultural centre of the country.
By contrast, Iran can still be prevented from joining the nuclear club. Anyway, even if Iran should prove to be deterrable it will still be the case that under a nuclear shield it would be a stronger and more effective enemy of the West. Says Galbraith again:
From the inception of Iran’s nuclear program under the Shah, prestige and the desire for recognition have been motivating factors. Iranians want the world, and especially the US, to see Iran as they do themselves—as a populous, powerful, and responsible country that is heir to a great empire and home to a 2,500-year-old civilization.
I also would like to see Iran as Iranians do. If that was the case then I would be as sanguine about Iran’s bombs as I am already about Israel’s. It would be a whole lot easier if the country’s leaders spoke and acted responsibly. But they don’t. Which causes doubt. Which is not compatible with nuclear security.
Thursday, 18, October, 2007 at 5:15 pm
Dr Betz -
“To which I say: result! 5-10 and a repeat is better than nothing. So Hillary Clinton is right to keep the option in her handbag which was the thrust of the Times article I linked to originally. ”
Well, yes, but that is not the only result that will occur. The aforementioned death & destruction of course, the greatly increased radicalization of the Iranian and wider Muslim population, the greatly decreased chances of a decent resolution in Iraq, etc. etc. … If it just a matter of kicking the can down the road, fine - but it won’t be.
“How do you not see Rafsanjani’s quote as speaking quite directly to the question of deterrence, the central plank of which is mutual assured destruction?”
That’s exactly my point. The Iranians accept the principle of deterrence - just they see Israel as the aggressive party to be deterred. I do not see it as evidence of a first-strike embrace-the-apocalypse statement, which many have taken it as.
Regarding NK - NK was not a confirmed nuclear power when Bush kiboshed the Clinton treaty and refused to talk. This refusal did not stop the NKs from gaining a nuclear weapon. A similar negotiating strategy with Iran, that of only sticks and no carrots, will not either — that was my point in mentioning in NK. Any real negotiating strat with Iran cannot begin and end with “stop the program or airstrikes.”
“Anyway, even if Iran should prove to be deterrable it will still be the case that under a nuclear shield it would be a stronger and more effective enemy of the West.”
This is true. However this future possibility must be measured against the level of danger it would pose now as an enraged enemy of the West, with revitalized public support, enormous political capital in the Muslim world, and convinced beyond a doubt that it is trapped in an existential war with a West determined to keep it down at all costs. The Iran of today negotiates with Americans in Baghdad and trades with Europe and Japan, has a relatively pro-American youth population, and does not supply either the Taliban or Shi’i militias with ATGMs, MANPADs, or real antitank mines. Do you want to flip the switch on that just in order to kick the can down the road again?
Sunday, 21, October, 2007 at 7:52 pm
[...] was that all about then? Following on from our blog discussion about whether or not Israel would have the balls to bomb sufficient will to launch airstrike [...]
Monday, 22, October, 2007 at 11:42 am
I would be interested in hearing any critiques of my article with Dr. Raas on IAF capabilities. As we argue in the article, it is entirely possible (if tricky) to launch an attack on Iran without refueling in hostile airspace. The northern route we describe does so as does the central route over Iraq.
I would also add that the apparent ease with which the IAF struck Dayr az Zawr on 6 SEPT (apparent attrition rate of 0) while possibly crossing Turkish airspace makes the northern route look even more promising. Assuming the IAF follows a similar flight profile to attack Iran- north from Israel, refuel over the Med, landfall somewhere NW of Aleppo, along the Turkey-Syria border to Iran, then down to Esfahan- the distance is roughly 1500-1600 km. This is within our estimate for the F-15Is combat radius with external fuel.
Tanking will clearly be the key issue for getting to the target and back, as it will likely require both pre-strike and post-strike tanking over the Med in this case. Fuel flow rates and tanker loitering time will be critical.
The statement that “The IAF will not even attempt an Iraq overflight in the face of American opposition” may well be true, but is nonetheless an assertion of Israeli calculus rather than an established fact.
Monday, 22, October, 2007 at 4:44 pm
“I would also add that the apparent ease with which the IAF struck Dayr az Zawr on 6 SEPT (apparent attrition rate of 0) while possibly crossing Turkish airspace makes the northern route look even more promising. Assuming the IAF follows a similar flight profile to attack Iran- north from Israel, refuel over the Med, landfall somewhere NW of Aleppo, along the Turkey-Syria border to Iran, then down to Esfahan- the distance is roughly 1500-1600 km. This is within our estimate for the F-15Is combat radius with external fuel.”
Would the Israelis want to fly the vast majority of that distance over hostile (Syrian, then Iranian) airspace with Ra’ams which must drop tanks to engage or evade if intercepted?
Could the Israelis be confident that their fighters could fly with impunity over Iranian airspace? These aren’t stealth aircraft. An aggressive air force like the IRIAF would be more likely to engage than a relatively decrepit Syrian Air Force, and the lengthy trip would give them more than enough time. The IAF do not have enough long-range fighters to provide any sort of cover or to hit the Iranian C3 or AAA network in any strength - the Iranians would be able to engage the strike force directly and force them to drop tanks. The Iranians know as well that simply doing this is enough to force a mission abort and win the strategic victory.
Tuesday, 23, October, 2007 at 5:38 am
No one really WANTS to fly combat missions with tanks, but it is done all the time. Yes, the package would be mostly, though probably not entirely self-defending (In our assessment, about 8 or so F-16Is could be dedicated to SEAD or CAP). Both the F-15I and F-16I can engage BVR vastly more effectively than most if not all IRIAF aircraft. They can do this in most cases without dropping tanks. Heck, you can do a lot of things without dropping tanks. And keep in mind the combat radius for the F-15I without tanks (that is, internal plus CFTs) is still around 1300 km.
Further, the IRIAF is roughly as decrepit and undertrained as the SAF. They have relatively poor EW coverage, do not conduct realistic training ops, and may not even be able to do GCI very well. It is the Iranian SAMs that could cause problems, not the flying scrap yard that makes up the bulk of the IRIAF. As for striking the network in strength, this is always nice to do, but not a requirement, as Osirak, EL DORADO CANYON, and other one-shot raids show.
Further, our article does not argue that the attack requires flying “with impunity” over Iranian airspace. It is entirely possible, maybe even likely, that the IAF would lose one or more aircraft. As long as the loss rate is not very, very high by historical standards, there is still a high probability of successfully striking the targets.
Finally, the F-15I and F-16I were purchased with exactly this sort of mission in mind. It seems strange to argue that an air force as competent as the IAF would purchase aircraft to do a mission that it would not undertake under even the most dire (i.e. a potential existential threat) circumstances. Would this mission be risky? Of course; so was the Osirak strike. But that is very different from impossible or even highly unlikely.
Tuesday, 23, October, 2007 at 2:52 pm
Thanks for contributing to this rumbling debate Austin. It is great to have an expert perspective on this. Note that debate continues on a more recent post:
http://kingsofwar.wordpress.com/2007/10/21/what-was-that-all-about-then/
Wednesday, 24, October, 2007 at 12:46 am
“No one really WANTS to fly combat missions with tanks, but it is done all the time. Yes, the package would be mostly, though probably not entirely self-defending (In our assessment, about 8 or so F-16Is could be dedicated to SEAD or CAP). Both the F-15I and F-16I can engage BVR vastly more effectively than most if not all IRIAF aircraft. They can do this in most cases without dropping tanks. Heck, you can do a lot of things without dropping tanks. And keep in mind the combat radius for the F-15I without tanks (that is, internal plus CFTs) is still around 1300 km.”
The SAM network + IRIAF + flight distance make this tricky indeed. Yes, the IAF can probably kill a lot more IRIAF fighters than IRIAF can kill of them, but that’s not the question - can IRIAF interdict and force enough IAF fighters to drop tanks to scrap the mission? Certainly IRIAF knows that this would be their real mission, not to attrit IAF fighters. I also think that IRIAF is a bit more formidable than the SAAF - Cooper & Devlin’s article “Iran: A Formidable Opponent?” makes the case reasonably well even if you don’t buy all their arguments.
“As for striking the network in strength, this is always nice to do, but not a requirement, as Osirak, EL DORADO CANYON, and other one-shot raids show.”
None of those involved flying over 1000km over Iranian airspace with little envelope for evasive maneuver or detour, however.
“Further, our article does not argue that the attack requires flying “with impunity” over Iranian airspace. It is entirely possible, maybe even likely, that the IAF would lose one or more aircraft. As long as the loss rate is not very, very high by historical standards, there is still a high probability of successfully striking the targets.”
Again, the attrition rate is immaterial. What matters is whether or not Iranian air defenses and IRIAF can force enough IAF fighters to have enough fuel problems to abort or not.
“Finally, the F-15I and F-16I were purchased with exactly this sort of mission in mind. It seems strange to argue that an air force as competent as the IAF would purchase aircraft to do a mission that it would not undertake under even the most dire (i.e. a potential existential threat) circumstances. Would this mission be risky? Of course; so was the Osirak strike. But that is very different from impossible or even highly unlikely.”
Nothing’s impossible, obviously. However IAF must factor in that the likelihood of success may not be high, a repeat strike would be impossible, and, if they have to launch it at all, that it would take place in the face of American opposition, which would lower the chances for success.
Wednesday, 24, October, 2007 at 6:07 am
“The SAM network + IRIAF + flight distance make this tricky indeed. Yes, the IAF can probably kill a lot more IRIAF fighters than IRIAF can kill of them, but that’s not the question - can IRIAF interdict and force enough IAF fighters to drop tanks to scrap the mission? Certainly IRIAF knows that this would be their real mission, not to attrit IAF fighters. I also think that IRIAF is a bit more formidable than the SAAF - Cooper & Devlin’s article “Iran: A Formidable Opponent?” makes the case reasonably well even if you don’t buy all their arguments.”
Tricky, certainly; and I would argue that ditching tanks/munitions and aborting mission is attrition (or “virtual attrition” if you prefer). But sometimes it is forgotten that Osirak was launched over a distance that was at the outer edge of the F-16’s range as well. My central disagreement with Cooper and Devlin is that the IRIAF’s performance ranged from barely adequate to very bad (against an equally inept opponent) in the Iran-Iraq War and they have not substantially improved their training since then. This is quite apart from the fact that the vast majority of its aircraft are crummy (which they are).
“None of those involved flying over 1000km over Iranian airspace with little envelope for evasive maneuver or detour, however.”
Fair point on distance over hostile airspace, but it is wrong to say “with little envelope…” The conservative estimate for fully loaded combat radius with external fuel from our article is 1,700 km. The operative term is “combat radius”- meaning including combat maneuvers. The ferry range (i.e. flying in a non-maneuvering profile) is 3800-5600+ km, depending on who you believe, meaning that the radius would be 1900-2800+ km. In other words, there is a built-in margin for detour or maneuever equivalent to at least 200 km if not much more. Also, one would likely put less than a full load-out onboard.
“Again, the attrition rate is immaterial. What matters is whether or not Iranian air defenses and IRIAF can force enough IAF fighters to have enough fuel problems to abort or not. ”
This is an overstatement. One can always choose to not drop tanks, lose a few planes, and complete the mission. Or you can drop tanks, complete the mission, and ditch over northern Iraq (maybe even with Sayeret guys in position). Neither of these are happy outcomes but if one truly believes that a nuclear Iran is an existential threat to Israel they would seem small prices to pay.
This is, of couse, assuming that the IRIAF aircraft can even find the IAF fighters- I actually doubt that they can. It is much harder to intercept jet aircraft than is generally thought. If you haven’t read Marshall Michel’s book Clashes, you should. I would also check out the Biddle/Zirkle article describing why PAVN air defense was good and Iraq’s was so bad- many of the same logics apply to Iran.
“Nothing’s impossible, obviously. However IAF must factor in that the likelihood of success may not be high, a repeat strike would be impossible, and, if they have to launch it at all, that it would take place in the face of American opposition, which would lower the chances for success.”
We actually wrote the article because many were/are claiming that the strike would be impossible. I have never argued it would be an easy lay-up of a mission (though I think we still differ on probability of success). I also disagree that a repeat strike would be impossible. One could, for example, choose an alternate route for the next one after waiting a few months. Hard, yes; impossible, no.
American opposition only lowers the chance for success if you fly through territory that Americans control, and perhaps not even then. What would the U.S. actually do if blips showed up crossing the border near al Walid? Scramble F-18s from Al Asad and engage? Or just rip out a string of words not for use in polite company?
Wednesday, 24, October, 2007 at 9:20 am
Couple of quick responses:
“I also disagree that a repeat strike would be impossible. One could, for example, choose an alternate route for the next one after waiting a few months. Hard, yes; impossible, no.”
Politically it would be extremely difficult and militarily much harder. Any genuine BDA without repeated strikes and flyovers would be difficult - satellite imaging doesn’t do well for this sort of thing. The Iranians will immediately disperse and harden further. Every Arab and Muslim country in the region would be on guard against a future strike and likely would feel compelled to fire on any new overflight.
“American opposition only lowers the chance for success if you fly through territory that Americans control, and perhaps not even then. What would the U.S. actually do if blips showed up crossing the border near al Walid? Scramble F-18s from Al Asad and engage? Or just rip out a string of words not for use in polite company?”
Not flying through American airspace removes the best route to Iran. What the Americans would do is debatable, but at the least they could intercept the IAF flight and force it to return. One would hope the Israelis would not be so arrogant as to chance the American alliance on such a reckless course of action.
Wednesday, 24, October, 2007 at 1:28 pm
When it comes to Iranian and Arab response, we are now into the realm of political prediction and supposition. For example, maybe Saudi Arabia would actually pay attention to air defense, maybe they wouldn’t. Maybe they would shoot, maybe they wouldn’t. I can’t say.
What I can say is that BDA can be done with satellites (that’s how the U.S. did BDA after Osirak if I remember correctly). The Iranians could disperse surviving centrifuges if they could get them out of Natanz (which is likely to be at a minimum damaged and contaminated with both uranium and hydroflouric acid), but that is about all that can be quickly moved- Esfahan is a whole chemical factory. Also, dispersal might actually give away previously unknown sites. U.S. jets could intercept the IAF flight but then what? An uncooperative bogey requires action be taken- would U.S. fighters fire on Israelis? Would the U.S. play chicken?
If your main objection is that an IAF strike is a bad idea, you have a very defensible position. My point, however, is that “bad idea” and “not feasible” are two different things.
Monday, 29, October, 2007 at 12:12 am
Consider this, too http://www.samsonblinded.org/news/muslim-world/pakistan
Tuesday, 4, December, 2007 at 2:41 pm
[...] is all over the Internet but since a while back I posted in Folly to Attack Iran? my case for not shying from attack if Iran could not be encouraged t0 desist from its nuclear [...]
Wednesday, 23, January, 2008 at 10:31 am
Just to bring the debate back online since it was going so hot and heavy earlier, the Wall Street Journal carried a longish article supporting the case for military action against Iran at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120103739264407641.html?mod=googlenews_wsj
While I’m personally not yet persuaded as to the merits of the case for attacking Iran, the one thought that worries me is that the concepts of deterrence and MAD depend on rational actors on both sides using roughly the same calculus as to benefits and costs for the use or non use of nuclear weapons. Therefore the part that makes me think a little is:
“Bernard Lewis, the leading contemporary authority on the culture of the Islamic world, has explained why:
MAD, mutual assured destruction, [was effective] right through the cold war. Both sides had nuclear weapons. Neither side used them, because both sides knew the other would retaliate in kind. This will not work with a religious fanatic [like Mr. Ahmadinejad]. For him, mutual assured destruction is not a deterrent, it is an inducement. We know already that [the mullahs ruling Iran] do not give a damn about killing their own people in great numbers. We have seen it again and again. In the final scenario, and this applies all the more strongly if they kill large numbers of their own people, they are doing them a favor. They are giving them a quick free pass to heaven and all its delights.”
Now I freely acknowledge that Mr. Ahmadinejad doesn’t have full control of the various militaries within Iran, specifically the Revolutionary Guards. That makes it even more worrisome since it is potentially somebody even more fanatical who might have their finger on the trigger.